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ABSTRACT

There is a large body of literature arguing that positive
perceived legitimacy is a critical factor in the success of
internationalcriminal courts, and that courts can be engineered
in such a way that they will be positively perceived by adjusting
factors such as their institutionalstructureand outreach efforts.
But in many situations the perceived legitimacy of international
criminal courts has almost nothing to do with these factors.
This Article takes the latest research in social psychology and
applies it to survey data about perceptions of international
criminal courts in order to understand how affected populations
form attitudes about courts. The resulting conclusions are at
odds with most other theorists' understanding of perceived
legitimacy. Where there is a high degree of identification
between large parts of the affected population and the "sides"in
the conflict that led to the establishment of a court, the way in
which the court is perceived will be determined largely by whom
the court prosecutes. Indictments that conflict with the
dominant internal narratives among the various groups will
lead directly to lower perceptions of the court's legitimacy.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Domestic perceived legitimacy 1 is supposed to be a critical factor
in the success of all transitional justice mechanisms. For example,

1.
Perceived legitimacy, as it is used in this Article, refers only to how
audiences subjectively perceive the legitimacy of international criminal courts. It has
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Professor Jaya Ramji-Nogales argues that effective transitional
justice mechanisms are those that "successfully reconstruct social
norms opposing mass violence," and that the local population must
perceive such mechanisms as legitimate before it will internalize the
norms these mechanisms represent. 2 In this way, she makes
perceived legitimacy a prerequisite to the success of all transitional
justice mechanisms, including international criminal courts.3 Others
have made similar arguments. For example, Professor Laura
Dickinson made perceived legitimacy a key aspect of her seminal
article on hybrid tribunals, 4 and perceived legitimacy is also

no normative component (i.e., it says nothing about whether courts should be perceived
as legitimate). Indeed, in many of the circumstances discussed here, the perceived
legitimacy of courts among particular groups is at odds with the apparent moral and
legal legitimacy of those courts' actions. Cf. Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the
Legitimacy of the InternationalCriminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1400, 1436-38
(2008) (discussing different kinds of legitimacy and noting the potential for tension
between perceived legitimacy and moral or legal legitimacy). Perceived legitimacy is
functionally similar to sociological legitimacy, which has been studied by legal scholars.
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1795-96 (2008); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke TransitionalJustice: A
Pluralist Process Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 12-13 (2010) ("[Sociological
legitimacy] affects the decision calculus of actors with respect to compliance ....).
Furthermore, this Article focuses on domestic perceived legitimacy-the perception of
the legitimacy of the tribunal among those individuals and communities that were
directly affected by the crimes the tribunal is investigating. Of course, this is not the
only perceived legitimacy that matters. The international community's perception of a
court's legitimacy also matters, particularly for issues like funding, but this would be
international perceived legitimacy. See, e.g., deGuzman, supra, at 1444-46 (discussing
the international perceived legitimacy of the International Criminal Court). This
Article will confine itself to a discussion of domestic perceived legitimacy. In fact,
unless otherwise noted, references to perceived legitimacy should be read as references
to domestic perceived legitimacy.
2.
Ramji-Nogales, supra note 1, at 3-4. There is a theoretical basis for this
emphasis on perceived legitimacy. Numerous studies by psychologists and sociologists
have concluded that legitimacy is important to political and legal institutions because
individuals are more likely to voluntarily adopt the norms of such institutions to
regulate their own conduct when the institutions are perceived as legitimate. See Tom
R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 375, 376-79 (2006) (providing an overview of psychological research relating
to legitimacy). But see James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Defenders of
Democracy? Legitimacy, Popular Acceptance and the South African Constitutional
Court, 65 J. POL. 1, 23 (2003) (concluding that the perceptions of the South African
Constitutional Court's legitimacy did not readily translate into acquiescence in the
Court's decisions); infra Part III.D (arguing that the existing research on why
institutions are perceived as legitimate does not do a good job of explaining how
affected populations perceive international criminal courts).
3.
Ramji-Nogales, supra note 1, at 13 ("[Alchieving legitimacy is of paramount
importance to transitional justice mechanisms.").
4.
Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295,
301-03, 306 (2003) (arguing that both fully international courts and solely domestic
courts will face problems of perceived legitimacy that can be mitigated by the use of
hybrid courts).
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important to arguments about the success of international criminal
courts advanced by William Burke-White, 5 Etelle Higonnet, 6 Jane
Stromseth, 7 Sarah Nouwen,8 and James Cockayne. 9 In short, there is
a large body of literature arguing that positive perceived legitimacy is
an important factor not only in the success of international criminal
courts, but also in the success of all transitional justice mechanisms.
That same body of literature also argues that international
criminal courts (and other transitional justice mechanisms) can be
engineered in such a way that they will be positively perceived. Thus,
Professor Ramji-Nogales argues that individual transitional justice
mechanisms should be consciously designed to maximize their
perceived legitimacy, 10 while Professor Dickinson famously argued
that changes to outreach efforts and institutional structure can
improve perceptions of legitimacy." Other scholars have made
arguments along these lines. 12 The result of this literature is a list of
factors that various scholars have argued can be adjusted to improve
the perceived legitimacy of courts, including: (1) the process by which
the court is created, 13 (2) the location of the court 14 (3) the

5.
William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law
Enforcement: A PreliminaryExploration,38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 729, 736-37 (2003).
6.
Etelle R. Higonnet, RestructuringHybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and
National CriminalJustice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 347, 359-61 (2005).
7.
Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict:
What Impact on Building the Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 251, 260, 268-69, 281
(2007).
Sarah M.H. Nouwen, 'Hybrid Courts' The Hybrid Category of a New Type
8.
of InternationalCrimes Courts, 2 UTRECHT L. REV. 190, 191 (2006).
9.
James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes
Tribunals,28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 638 (2004).
10.
See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 1, at 14-16. She argues that this can be
done by paying careful attention to the sources from which the institution is
constituted, the procedure by which it was created, and the substance of the rules it
uses. Id. at 16.
11.
For example, she attributed the poor perceived legitimacy of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to: (1) the physical
distance between the Hague and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY); (2) the
failure to engage in outreach; (3) the lack of participation by domestic personnel; and
(4) the use of a fundamentally common law process in a civil law country. Dickinson,
supra note 4, at 303.
12.
Burke-White, supra note 5, (stating that location of the court and the
composition of the staff both can affect perceived legitimacy); Higonnet, supra note 6,
at 361-63, 418-19, 423-26 (noting that local participation and physical proximity will
increase perceived legitimacy, and that the ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) were perceived negatively because they did not engage in sufficient
outreach); Stromseth, supra note 7, at 260, 268-69, 281 (arguing that locally situated
courts will be perceived as more legitimate, incorporation of more national staff can
increase legitimacy, and that lack of outreach efforts led to negative perceptions of the
ICTR and ICTY).
This has been advocated by Professor Ramji-Nogales. Ramji-Nogales, supra
13.
note 1, at 16; see supra note 10.
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composition of the staff, 15 (4) the institutional structure,1 6 (5) the
procedures used during the trials, 17 and (6) the court's outreach
efforts.' 8 But is it true that the perceived legitimacy of international
criminal courts among affected populations 9 is driven primarily by
these factors? Both theory and abundant evidence indicate that in the
majority of situations the answer is no.
This Article takes the latest research in social psychology and
applies it to extensive survey data about how affected populations
perceive international criminal courts in order to understand how
these populations form attitudes about courts and to propose a new
model of perceived legitimacy. The resulting conclusions are at odds
with most other theorists' understanding of perceived legitimacy. To
begin with, only a tiny percentage of the affected population will
know how the court was created, the institutional structure it has, or
the procedures it uses, and outreach efforts are unlikely to overcome
this fundamental ignorance. 20 If almost none of the population knows
about these factors, then it follows that perceptions of legitimacy
cannot be a direct result of such factors. Of course, perceptions of
legitimacy could be indirectly driven by these factors, but this does
not appear to be the case.
Both theory and numerous attitude surveys indicate that where
there is a high degree of identification between groups within the
affected population and the "sides" in the conflict that led to the
involvement of a court, the affected population's perception of the

14.
Burke-White, supra note 5, at 737; Higonnet, supra note 6, at 361-63;
Stromseth, supra note 7, at 260, 281; see Dickinson, supra note 4, at 305.
15.
This has been advocated by Professors Dickinson, Burke-White, Stromseth,
and Higonnet. See supra notes 11-12 (arguing that local presence is important for the
perceived legitimacy of a court).
16.
This has been advocated by Professor Dickinson. See supra note 11
(discussing the advantages of hybrid courts, that is, courts with both a national and an
international component).
17.
This has been advocated by Professor Ramji-Nogales. Ramji-Nogales, supra
note 1, at 16; see supra note 10.
18.
Burke-White, supra note 5, at 737-38; Higonnet, supranote 6, at 361, 365;
Stromseth, supra note 7, at 260-61, 281; see Dickinson, supra note 4, at 304 (relating
the importance of links between the formal institutions and the local population). This
has been advocated by Professors Dickinson, Stromseth, and Higonnet. See supra notes
11-12.
19.
In this Article, "affected population" means those individuals within a
country or society that have been affected by whatever violations of international
criminal law the court is tasked with addressing. It includes both direct victims (i.e.,
rape victims, torture victims, victims of physical violence, etc.) as well as whole
communities that were affected whether directly or indirectly by the atrocities. In
contrast, the term "group" is used to denote a particular subset of the affected
population that is usually defined by its attitude toward other groups, the conflict and
the resulting court. See infra Part IV.A and text accompanying notes 33-35.
20.
See infra Part II.B.2.a, II.B.2.c.
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court will be determined largely by whom the court prosecutes.
When the court's indictments and prosecutions conflict with a group's
dominant internal narrative about responsibility for the conflict,
members of the group are likely to perceive the court as biased and
unjust, which allows the group to discount the indictments and
preserve its internal narrative. This can lead directly to lower
perceptions of the court's legitimacy. Not all indictments undermine a
court's legitimacy, though. For example, indictments will sometimes
agree with dominant internal narratives within particular affected
22
populations, and will not produce lower perceptions of legitimacy.
Nor will all indictees have a large following that identifies strongly
23
with them.
Nonetheless, in a majority of situations, perceptions of a court's
legitimacy among the affected population will be driven primarily by
whom the court indicts. 24 Moreover, in circumstances where all of the
participants in a conflict have significant followings, perceived
legitimacy will often be a negative sum game. 25 In these
circumstances, virtually any attempt to assign responsibility for
crimes will cause a net loss in perceived legitimacy among the
affected population as a whole. This has important implications for
transitional justice, as many scholars have argued that positive
perceived legitimacy is crucial to the success of international criminal
courts. 26 If these scholars are correct, courts in some situations
cannot succeed because virtually everything they do causes them to
be viewed negatively, and this problem is not limited to courts. There
is reason to believe that other transitional justice mechanisms also
27
face situations where perceived legitimacy is a negative sum game.
One possibility is that transitional justice mechanisms simply cannot
be successful in situations where different affected groups identify
strongly with different sides in the conflict.
The Author does not believe that this is the case. Rather, the
fundamental problem in such situations is the mismatch between

21.
See infraPart II.B.2.b.
The fact that the ICTY assigned primary responsibility for serious
22.
violations of international criminal law in the former Yugoslavia to ethnic Serbs
mirrored the dominant internal narrative among ethnic Bosniaks and thus did not
induce poor perceptions of the ICTY among Bosniaks. For a discussion of Bosniak
support for the ICTY, see infra text accompanying notes 56-59.
23.
For example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)'s indictment of
leaders of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC) did not seem to lower perceptions of the SCSL's legitimacy in Sierra
Leone because neither the RUF nor AFRC had significant numbers of followers. See
infra text accompanying notes 200-09.
24.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
25.
26.
See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
27.
See infra note 298.
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dominant internal narratives about the conflict and what actually
happened in the conflict-groups are very likely to view themselves
as the victims of aggression by other groups, even when this is not
true. 28 This mismatch ultimately causes negative perceptions of the
court when members of the group are indicted and prosecuted. It also
serves as an obstacle to post-conflict reconciliation as it prevents the
participants from accepting responsibility and causes each group to
29
blame the other groups for what happened during the conflict.
Courts can serve a useful purpose in transitional justice if they can
help align the dominant internal narratives within the various
affected populations with what actually happened-and there is
evidence that they can-although they cannot be expected to do this
on their own, and the process is very slow. 30 Ultimately, this will
simultaneously improve perceptions of their legitimacy and remove
an obstacle to reconciliation. From this perspective, short-term
negative perceived legitimacy is not necessarily a sign of failure.
Rather, it is the price to be paid for trying to break down internal
narratives that are hindering reconciliation between groups. In the
long term, if a court can help break down these internal narratives, it
will improve its own perceived legitimacy while at the same time
opening the door to reconciliation.
Part II of this Article begins by describing how the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was perceived in
the Balkans and shows that the traditional model of perceived
legitimacy cannot explain the attitudes toward the ICTY. 31 Subpart
II.B presents an alternative model of perceived legitimacy, the social
psychology model, which provides a better explanation of how the
ICTY was perceived. Part III applies the social psychology model to
perceptions of the legitimacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(ECCC), and the Regulation 64 Panels in Kosovo. The implications of
the social psychology model for the success of international criminal
courts are explored in Part IV.

See infra Part IV.C.
28.
See infra text accompanying notes 303-04.
29.
See infra Part IV.D-E (proposing that courts can break down inaccurate
30.
internal narratives over time by making available evidence about the conflict).
When this Article uses the phrase "traditional model of perceived
31.
legitimacy," it is a reference to the model most previous scholars have used, where
courts largely have control over how they are perceived, and perceptions of their
legitimacy can be improved by changes to things like institutional structure and
outreach efforts. See supranotes 10-18 and accompanying text.
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II. TOWARD A BETTER MODEL OF PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY
Most theorists assume that domestic perceptions of legitimacy of
international criminal courts are driven largely by factors such as: (1)
the process by which they are created, (2) the location of the court, (3)
the composition of the staff, (4) the institutional structure, (5) the
procedures used during the trials, and (6) the court's outreach
efforts. 32 But a detailed review of the theoretical and empirical
evidence, including numerous surveys that explore attitudes toward
various international criminal courts, demonstrates that these factors
do not adequately explain how affected populations perceive such
courts. Thus, this Article proposes a new model, called the social
psychology model, which provides a better explanation of the
perceived legitimacy of international criminal courts.
A. The Example of the ICTY
The perception of the ICTY among various groups in the former
Yugoslavia demonstrates that the way in which an affected
population perceives a court can be driven primarily by whom the
court indicts and prosecutes. 33 To begin with, there are often multiple
groups within an affected population that react in different ways to
the tribunal. Often these groups divide along ethnic, national, or
religious lines that correlate with the "sides" in the conflict that led to
the involvement of the tribunal. 34 In Bosnia-Herzegovina there are
three identifiable groups that are relevant to this Article: ethnic
Bosniaks, ethnic Croats, and ethnic Serbs. One's ethnicity largely
determined which side in the conflict one identified with and
35
supported.

32.
See sources cited supra notes 12-18.
33.
This Article principally uses the example of the ICTY to demonstrate the
social psychology model for two reasons. First, there was a strong identification
between the affected population and the sides in the conflict. Thus one would predict
that the effect of motivated reasoning and cognitive dissonance on attitudes toward the
court would be strong. See infra text accompanying notes 118-21. Second, there have
been many good surveys of attitudes toward the ICTY among the various affected
groups in the former Yugoslavia. Thus there is much more data that can be used to test
the validity of the social psychology model than is available for other courts. Several
other courts are discussed in later sections. See infra Part III. However, the lack of
survey data for these other courts in some cases limits the conclusions that can be
drawn about them. On a related note, the Author would have liked to address the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in this Article, but was unable to find
sufficient survey data to draw any meaningful conclusions about how the ICTR has
been perceived by Rwandans or what drives those perceptions.
34.
See infra Part IV.A.
35.
A survey of attitudes toward the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina found a
very strong correlation between ethnic identity and support for a particular side during
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Unsurprisingly, each side had a dominant internal narrative
about what happened during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
The International Committee of the Red Cross's People on War
Project, 36 which interviewed thousands of people affected by the
conflict, found that all three of the groups viewed themselves as
waging a fundamentally defensive war against aggression by the
other groups. 37 In effect, each group perceived itself as the victim.
Ethnic Serbs in particular rejected responsibility for the
disintegration of Yugoslavia and the resulting atrocities. 38 One 2004
survey found that 84 percent of Serbians believed Serbs had been the
largest group of victims of the conflict, while only 8 percent believed

the conflict. INT'L COMM. RED CROSS [ICRC], PEOPLE ON WAR PROJECT: BOSNIAHERZEGOVINA COUNTRY REPORT 2 (1999). According to that survey, 87 percent of
Serbs, 72 percent of Bosniaks, and 70 percent of Croats took sides during the conflict.
"The conflict divided almost the whole of the population along national/ethnic
lines .... " Id. at 2. This will not always be the case, however. The section below on the
Special Court for Sierra Leone indicates that only one of the main participants in the
conflict, the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), had a close identification with a particular
ethnic group, the Mende. The other two armed groups, the RUF and the AFRC, do not
appear to have been supported by particular ethnic, religious or national groups. See
infra Part III.A.
36.
ICRC, supra note 35.
37.
See id. at 14-22.
The distinction between defender and aggressor defines this as a war with
sides. People did not just identify with the various parties to the conflict; they
did not just take up a nationalist identity. They adopted an historical
interpretation of events that established their own community as the defenders
against aggression ....
Id. at 16-17; see also Human Rights Ctr. & Ctr. for Human Rights, Report: Justice,
Accountability and Social Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and
Prosecutors, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L JUST. 102, 127-36 (2000).
38.
See Mirko Klarin, The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the
Former Yugoslavia, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 89, 93 (2009) (discussing the Serbs' negative
opinion of the ICTY and decreasing percentages of Serbs who feel that "facing the truth
in war is important for the future"); Bojan Toncic, Serbia: Milosevic Trial Grips Nation,
INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Feb. 15, 2002), http://iwpr.net/report-news/serbiamilosevic-trial-grips-nation ("The Serbs are not only unable to acknowledge war crimes
but they are also convinced they never occurred .. "). The Serbs interviewed for Bojan
Toncic's article tended to refer to themselves as victims and viewed the West as the
criminals. Toncic, supra. One person described Milosevi6 as the "defender of Serbs,"
while another viewed the trial of Milosevi6 as an attempt by the West to portray Serbs
as "prone to genocide." Id. This was echoed by the party secretary of Milosevi6's
Socialist Party, who said: "This is not a trial against Milosevic but a trial against the
whole country. The consequences of this trial could be catastrophic for the Serbian
nation because it will be written in history that the Serbs are responsible for genocide."
Emily Shaw, The Role of Social Identity in Resistance to International Criminal Law:
The Case of Serbia and the ICTY 3 (May 1, 2003) (Berkeley Program in Soviet & PostSoviet Studies, Working Paper No. 5, 2003), available at http://iseees.berkeley.edul
bps/publications/2003_05-shaw.pdf.
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that Serbs had committed the largest number of crimes. 39 Each group
also felt that the laws of war should be applied primarily to those
40
they viewed as the aggressors (the other groups).
Serbs not only overwhelmingly rejected being labeled as
responsible for the largest number of crimes committed during the
conflict, but a sizable minority continues to believe that Serbs
committed no crimes at all. According to one survey conducted in
Serbia in 2002, nearly half of the respondents said that Serbs had not
committed a single crime during the Balkan conflict. 4 1 The person
responsible for carrying out the survey summarized it this way: "The
Serbs are not only unable to acknowledge war crimes but they are
also convinced they never occurred." 42 In a similar vein, Mirko Klarin
has noted that polls consistently show that between 35 and 38
percent of Serbs believe that "once [the] truth becomes known, 'it will
be proven once and for all that Serbs are not responsible for the
crimes they are blamed for. . . ."'43 Slobodan Milosevi6 played to this
narrative during his trial, where he blamed the West for the conflict,
described himself and all Serbs as victims, and alleged that the
breakup of Yugoslavia was the result of a "neo-colonial" design by the
West to create a Greater Albania out of the ruins of the former
44
Yugoslavia.
In this milieu, the ICTY was charged with impartially and justly
identifying and prosecuting those responsible for the most serious
atrocities that had occurred, 45 and most commentators have

39.
See DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, OPEN SOC'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, SHRINKING
THE SPACE FOR DENIAL: THE IMPACT OF THE ICTY IN SERBIA 86 (2008), available at
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/OSJI-Shrinking-the-Space.pdf
("84 percent of Serbian respondents said that they believe Serbs had the largest
number of victims during the wars in the former Yugoslavia from 1991 through
1995; ... only eight percent responded that Serbs committed the greatest number of
war crimes in that period."). These beliefs contrast sharply with demographic studies of
deaths caused by the conflict, which generally conclude that Bosniaks represented by
far the largest group of victims. See, e.g., Jan Zwierzchowski & Ewa Tabeau, CensusBased Multiple System Estimation of Casualties' Undercount 15 fig.3 & tbl.4, 17-18
available at
conference
paper),
2010)
(unpublished
tbl.6
(Feb.
1,
=
http://epc2OlO.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId 100880.
ICRC, supra note 35, at 14-22.
40.
41.
See Toncic, supra note 38 ("When we asked them to cite three war crimes
committed by Serbs, half of the interviewees said Serbs did not commit a single
crime."). This position is hard to reconcile with the large number of confessions by Serb
perpetrators that were entered into evidence at the ICTY. See infra notes 346-50 and
accompanying text.
42.
Toncic, supra note 38.
Klarin, supra note 38, at 93.
43.
Anthony Borden, Milosevic Rages Against the West, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE
44.
REPORTING (Feb. 15, 2002), http://iwpr.net/report-news/milosevic-rages-against-west.
45.
See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 1, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3,
1993) (noting that the ICTY had the power to prosecute "persons responsible for
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46
concluded that the ICTYs trials were largely just and impartial.
However, the ICTY's investigations resulted in large numbers of
trials against ethnic Serbs, and a much smaller number of trials
against Bosniaks and ethnic Croats. 47 Ethnic Serbs, in particular,
were charged with the most serious crimes. For example, ethnic Serbs
were found to be responsible for genocide at Srebrenica, 48 and the
ICTY essentially accused Slobodan Milosevi6 and the Serb political
leadership of masterminding the whole conflict. 49 In effect, the ICTY

serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia since 1991"). ICTY judges were required to be "persons of high
moral character, impartiality and integrity." Id. Annex art. 13. Trials were required to
be "fair and expeditious" and carried out in accordance with due process and with
regard to the rights of the accused. Id. Annex art. 20.
See Antonio Cassese, The ICTY: A Living and Vital Reality, 2 J. INT'L CRIM.
46.
JUST. 585, 586 (2004) ("ITihe ICTY not only got off the ground but has since proved to
");
be a superb judicial enterprise, capable of dispensing justice in a fair manner ....
Stromseth, supra note 7, at 319-20 ("The ICTY and ICTR have accomplished a great
deal in terms of bringing to justice, in fair legal proceedings, individuals accused of
major atrocities."); Patricia M. Wald, ICTY Judicial Proceedings:An Appraisal from
Within, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 466, 466 (2004) ("I believe it would be almost impossible
to find an impartial commentator in 2003 in Europe, Africa, Asia or the United States
who would contend that ICTY trials are not fair and in accordance with internationally
accepted criminal-law standards."). But see, e.g., Robert Hayden, Biased "Justice"
Humanrightsism and the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 549, 551 (1999) (accusing the ICTY of being biased and a tool for
Western interests). Of course, the ICTY has been repeatedly criticized for other aspects
of its operation, including the cost and length of trials. See, e.g., Ralph Zacklin, The
Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 541, 543 (2004)
("The delays in bringing detainees to trial-and the trials themselves-have generally
been so lengthy that questions have been raised as to the violation by the tribunals of
the basic human rights guarantees set out in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCRP).").
47.
Professor Orentlicher reports that two-thirds of the ICTY's defendants were
ethnic Serbs. ORENTLICHER, supra note 39, at 14-30. The Author's own analysis of the
ethnicity of the indictees at the ICTY finds that 68 percent of the indictees were Serb,
20 percent were Croat, and only 4 percent were Bosniak; the remaining indictees were
a mix of Kosovar Albanian, Macedonian, and a small number of individuals of
unknown ethnicity. This information is taken from a spreadsheet, "ICTY Case
Database," compiled by the Author after reviewing all of the indictments issued by the
ICTY.
Mark Drumbl, Case Note, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic: ICTY
48.
Authenticates Genocide at Srebrenica and Convicts for Aiding and Abetting, 5 MELB. J.
INT'L L. 434, 434 (2004); Katherine G. Southwick, Note, Srebrenica as Genocide? The
Krsti6 Decision and the Language of the Unspeakable, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J.
188, 188 (2005).
See INT'L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, CASE
49.
INFORMATION SHEET FOR SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC (2006), available at http://www.icty.org/x/
the
(summarizing
cases/slobodan-milosevic/cis/encis-milosevic-slobodan-en.pdf
indictments against Milosevi6); see alio ORENTLICHER, supra note 39, at 30-31 ('The
Prosecutor's case against Milosevi6 in effect placed the former Serbian leader at the
").
epicenter of the violence that ravaged the former Yugoslavia ....
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assigned primary responsibility to Serbs for the serious violations of
international criminal law committed during the conflict.
The ICTY's prosecutions ran counter to the dominant ethnic
Serbian narrative of victimhood. Thus, it hardly comes as a surprise
that ethnic Serbs perceived the ICTY as biased and partial. 50 A
number of surveys have been carried out regarding Serb attitudes
51
toward the ICTY. The South Eastern Europe Public Agenda Survey,
conducted in 2002, assessed how well various international
institutions were trusted in parts of South Eastern Europe. Only 5
percent of ethnic Serbs in Serbia 52 and 2 percent of ethnic Serbs in
the Republika Srpska 53 rated the ICTY as trustworthy. Another
survey carried out at the beginning of Milosevi6's trial in February
54
2002 found that four-fifths of Serbians viewed the ICTY as biased.
A 2007 survey by the Belgrade Center for Human Rights similarly
found that only 7 percent of Serbians believed the ICTY was
55
unbiased.
Ethnic Bosniaks, on the other hand, were predisposed to support
the ICTY because it essentially confirmed their internal narrative by
assigning blame largely to ethnic Serbs. In 1999, the International
Committee of the Red Cross's People on War Project found that 91
percent of Bosniaks supported prosecutions for war crimes. 56 Fully
two-thirds further believed that the ICTY should be responsible for
the prosecutions. 5 7 Three years later, in 2002, the South Eastern

50.
Donna E. Arzt, Views on the Ground: The Local Perceptionof International
Criminal Tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone, 603 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 226, 231-34 (2006); see also Cassese, supra note 46, at 595
(noting that ethnic Serbs in the former Yugoslavia considered the ICTY to be antiSerb); Human Rights Ctr. & Ctr for Human Rights, supra note 37, at 131-33 ("In
general, [Bosnian Serb] participants viewed the [ICTY] as a political body that was an
instrument of Western influence rather than an independent judicial institution.").
51.
INT'L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE [IDEA], SOUTH EAST
EUROPE (SEE) PUBLIC AGENDA SURVEY (2002), available at http://www.idea.int/
europe cis/balkans/see-survey.cfm. The survey was the
first ever professional measurement of public opinion undertaken
simultaneously throughout South East Europe [and] involved a total of 10,000
face-to-face interviews conducted during January and February 2002 in Serbia,
Montenegro and Kosovo, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (with two separate
surveys, one for the Federation and one for Republika Srpska), Croatia,
Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania.
Id.
52.
IDEA, SURVEY RESULTS: INTERNATIONAL ISSUES: SERBIA (2002), available
at http://archive.idea.intfbalkans/results/Serbia/serint3.htm.
53.
IDEA, SURVEY RESULTS: INTERNATIONAL ISSUES: SRPSKA (2002), available
at http://archive.idea.intfbalkans/results/Srpska/srp-int3.htm.
54.
Toncic, supra note 38.
55.
Klarin, supra note 38, at 92.
56.
ICRC, supra note 35, at 24.
57.
Id.
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Europe Public Agenda Survey returned similar results: within
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 70 percent of Bosniaks reported trusting the
ICTY. 58 In a series of surveys undertaken between 2001 and 2004,
the percentage of Bosniaks who said they supported the ICTY's work
hovered around 90 percent. 5 9
When the percentage of ethnic Bosniaks and Serbs indicted at
the ICTY is compared to the levels of trust in the ICTY among those
ethnic groups, a strong correlation appears, as demonstrated in
Figure 1 below. 60 This data bears out Mirko Klarin's observation that
"[t]he 'popularity' of the ICTY in the former Yugoslavia is inversely
proportional to the number of accused that come from these countries,
entities and particularly, ethnic communities. ' 61 For ethnic Serbs,
apparently justifiable decisions by the ICTY, such as identifying
ethnic Serbs as responsible for the systematic execution of thousands
of Bosniak men and boys in the aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica;
directly caused negative perceptions of its legitimacy.
Figure 1: Comparison of Trust in the ICTY and
Ethnicity of ICTY Indictees
80%
60%
U Trust

40%

13 Indictees
20%
0%
Ethnic Bosniaks

Ethnic Serbs

58.

IDEA, supra note 51.

59.

DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, OPEN SOC'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THAT SOMEONE

GUILTY BE PUNISHED: THE IMPACT OF THE ICTY IN BOSNIA 49 (2010), available at
http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ- FormerYugoslavia-Someone-Guilty- 2010English.pdf.
60.
The data on trust in the ICTY is taken from the reported responses to
question three of the "International Issues" part of the South Eastern Europe Public
Agenda Survey. That question read "I will read you a list of international institutions
from our country. For each of them, please tell me how much you trust them." IDEA,
COMPLETE

QUANTITATIVE

SURVEY

RESULTS

(2002),

available

at

http://archive.idea.intfbalkans/surveydetailed.cfm. The results shown are for ethnic
Bosniaks in Bosnia and ethnic Serbs in Serbia. See also supranotes 52, 58. The data on
the ethnicity of the ICTY indictees is taken from the Author's own analysis of the ICTY
indictments. See supra note 47.
61.
Klarin, supra note 38, at 92.
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The dramatically different ways in which Bosniaks and Serbs
viewed the ICTY cannot be explained with the factors traditionally
thought to determine the perceived legitimacy of courts. 62 These
disparate perceptions cannot be the result of institutional structure
because the institutional structure of the court was the same for both
groups. Similarly, they cannot be the result of the location of the
court, the manner in which it was created, the composition of its staff,
or its procedural rules. Again, these factors were the same for both
Bosniaks and Serbs. In short, the factors most often identified as
being important to perceived legitimacy cannot explain how the ICTY
was perceived in the former Yugoslavia. 63 Something else has to be
driving perceptions of legitimacy. In the case of the ICTY, perceptions
of legitimacy appear to be determined largely by how the court
attributed responsibility for the atrocities that were committed
during the conflict.
This explanation for how the ICTY was perceived in the Balkans
seems intuitively reasonable, but is there a theoretical basis for it?
Perhaps more importantly, can this explanation be generalized to
account for the reactions of affected populations to other courts?
Answers to these questions are most likely to be found in social
psychology, a subdiscipline of psychology that includes the study of
how groups make decisions and form attitudes.6 4 This Article looks to
social psychology to develop a general model6 5 of how affected
populations perceive international criminal courts.

For a discussion of the traditional factors, see supra text accompanying
62.
notes 13-18.
63.
See Klarin, supra note 38, at 90 ("[P]ublic opinion in the former Yugoslavia
is influenced very little by what the prosecution and the judges are actually doing in
the Hague.").
Social psychology is defined as "the scientific field that seeks to understand
64.
the nature and causes of individual behavior and thought in social situations." ROBERT
A. BARON, NYLA R. BRANSCOMBE & DONN BYRNE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 6 (12th ed.

2008).
It is becoming increasingly common for legal academics to incorporate
65.
research and methodologies that come from other fields. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles &
Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834 (2008) (noting
and encouraging the intersection of law, political science, and economics in "New Legal
Realism"). There are now a number of articles that turn to social psychology to improve
our understanding of how people interact with both the law and legal institutions. See,
e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Foreword, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some
Problems for ConstitutionalLaw, The Supreme Court 2010 Term, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1,
6-7 (2011) (stating that analyses of the neutrality of the law have focused on doctrine,
mistakenly leaving "social-psychological dynamics" out of the discussion, and proposing
an account centered on psychological mechanisms of analysis).
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B. Motivational and Cognitive Biases That Can Affect
Perceptions of Legitimacy
One of the most significant insights of social psychology is that
people are not fundamentally rational decision makers. 66 People do
not carefully weigh all of the available evidence before making every
decision. Nor do people always come to the correct decision even given
the evidence they do consider. Instead, human decision making is
often driven by motivational and cognitive biases, and the result is a
distorted view of the world and ourselves-a view that is often at
odds with the evidence. For example, among other things, people tend
to view themselves as causal agents even over -events that they
cannot control, they selectively view themselves as more responsible
for positive outcomes than negative ones, they downplay the
importance of things they do not do well, and they generally
overestimate both their own competence and their likelihood of future
success.

67

Cognitive biases are ways in which our reasoning fails to live up
to the ideal of the rational actor, even in circumstances where our
only motivation is accuracy in decision making. In effect, such biases
are ways in which human cognition is incapable of reaching a rational
ideal, even under perfect circumstances. Confirmation bias is one
example of a cognitive bias, and it can be present even in the absence
of a directional goal.6 8 Motivational biases, on the other hand, occur

66.
See Thomas D. Gilovich & Dale W. Griffin, Judgment and DecisionMaking,
in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 542, 555 (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed.
2009) ("The normative force of the axioms of rational choice is unassailable and hence
cannot be dispensed with. And yet it is an empirical fact that people's choices often fail
to conform to the axioms."); Eldar Shafir & Robyn A. LeBoeuf, Rationality, 53 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 491, 493 (2002) (arguing that the assumption of human rationality is
misguided and presenting summaries of dozens of experiments that show that humans
have been found to act in ways that are not rational). But see Gerald R. M. McKenzie,
Judgment and Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF COGNITION 321, 321-38 (Koen
Lamberts & Robert Goldstone eds., 2005) (arguing that much of the apparently nonnormative behavior identified in many laboratory settings is actually behavior that
works well in the real world and that some remaining differences from ideal normative
behavior can be explained by a rational trade-off between accuracy and the effort
needed to make a decision).
67.
David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, The Psychology of Self-Defense:
Self-Affirmation Theory, in 38 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 184
(M. P. Zanna ed., 2006); see also Steven J. Heine et al., Is There a Universal Need for
Positive Self-Regard?, 106 PSYCHOL. REV. 766, 779 (1999) (noting that people
selectively remember their past performance as better than it was and judge positive
personality attributes to be more appropriate in describing themselves than in
describing others).
68.
For example, the seminal study that identified confirmation bias used a
design that did not give the participants any goal other than accuracy. P.C. Wason, On
the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task, 12 Q.J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 129, 131 (1960). Subsequent explorations of the effect of motivated reasoning
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when our reasoning is affected by our desire to achieve a particular
outcome.6 9 Motivational biases can occur separately from cognitive
biases, and vice versa. 70 However, human reasoning appears to be
most biased when motivational biases and cognitive biases reinforce
one another.

1.

71

Motivated Reasoning

72
While cognitive biases were identified and studied first,
psychologists eventually realized that cognitive biases on their own

could not explain the extent to which human reasoning appeared to

be biased in favor of reaching self-serving conclusions. 73 This gave
rise to the study of motivated reasoning. The central tenet of
motivated reasoning is that "[p]eople are more likely to arrive at

on confirmation bias have duplicated Wason's initial finding that confirmation bias
exists even in the absence of motivated reasoning. Erica Dawson et al., Motivated
Reasoning and Performance on the Wason Selection Task, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1379 (2002). Confirmation bias is explained in detail in Part II.B.2.c of
this Article.
See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
69.
See supra note 68, infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (discussing the
70.
interplay of cognitive and motivational biases).
For example, studies have shown that the impact of cognitive biases is
71.
greater when people have directional goals. See Dawson et al., supra note 68, at 138586 (showing that people suffered greater effects from confirmation bias when they
wished to maintain a particular belief); infra notes 112-17, 150-55 (discussing how
cognitive dissonance is produced by cognitions that are inconsistent with one's selfconcept and how a stronger confirmation bias exists among those who have the most
preexisting knowledge about the subject matter); cf. Charles S. Taber & Milton Lodge,
Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluationof PoliticalBeliefs, 50 AM. J. POL. SCi. 755, 767
(2006) (noting that confirmation bias is much weaker when the issue being tested does
not generate a strong response from the individual).
For example, confirmation bias was identified in 1960. E.g., Wason, supra
72.
note 68. Cognitive dissonance was first proposed in the 1950s by Leon Festinger. See
Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance,
58 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203, 209 (1959) ('If a person is induced to do or say
something which is contrary to his private opinion, there will be a tendency for him to
change his opinion so as to bring it into correspondence with what he has done or
said.").
See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL.
73.
480, 493 (1990) (discussing the role cognitive processes play in producing biases). Of
course, people have understood motivated reasoning in a general sense for far longer
than it has been studied by psychologists. See, e.g., FRANCIS BACON, THE NEW
ORGANON ch. XLVI (Lisa Jardine & Michael Silverthorne eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2000) (1620) ("Once a man's understanding has settled on something (either because it
is an accepted belief or because it pleases him), it draws everything else also to support
and agree with it. And if it encounters a large number of more powerful countervailing
examples, it either fails to notice them, or disregards them, or makes fine distinctions
to dismiss and reject them, and all this with much dangerous prejudice, to preserve the
authority of its first conceptions.").
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those conclusions that they want to arrive at. '74 This is accomplished
in a number of ways. For example, people may selectively search their
memories for information that supports their desired outcome and
then use that information to construct beliefs that are biased toward
achieving that outcome. 75 They may also use different evidentiary
standards to evaluate new information depending on whether the
76
information is consistent with their directional goals or not.
Collectively, these strategies bias people in favor of the conclusion
they want to reach.
However, motivated reasoning has its limits. People are not at
liberty to believe anything they want, no matter how unlikely, simply
because it serves their interests.7 7 Rather, people strive to maintain

74.
Kunda, supra note 73, at 495; see also Dawson et al., supra note 68, at 1379
(noting that there is now extensive evidence that people are inclined to draw selfserving conclusions); John T. Jost et al., Political Conservatism as Motivated Social
Cognition, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 339 (2003) (presenting evidence that people's political
beliefs are partly the result of motivated reasoning); Matthew J. Lebo & Daniel
Cassino, The Aggregated Consequences of Motivated Reasoning and the Dynamics of
Partisan Presidential Approval, 28 POL. PSYCHOL. 719, 742-43 (2007) (presenting
evidence that motivated reasoning plays a role in presidential approval ratings);
Kahan, supra note 65, at 7 (defining motivated reasoning as the tendency to
unconsciously process information in a way that promotes goals or interests extrinsic to
the decision-making task).
75.
Kunda, supra note 73, at 483, 493-94 (noting that when people engage in
motivated reasoning, they only consider a biased subset of the relevant information
and rules, and that directional goals can enhance the accessibility of memories, beliefs
and rules that support the desired solution); Lebo & Cassini, supra note 74, at 722-23
(arguing that motivated reasoning is the result of selectively searching for confirmatory
information, selectively evaluating information depending on whether it is consistent
or inconsistent with existing beliefs, and selectively viewing inconsistent information
as consistent); Shailendra Pratap Jain & Durairaj Maheswaran, Motivated Reasoning:
A Depth-of-ProcessingPerspective, 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 358, 358 (2000) (arguing that
the motivation to arrive at a preferred conclusion enhances the use of those beliefs and
strategies that are most likely to yield the desired conclusion); David P. Redlawsk, Hot
Cognition or Cool Consideration? Testing the Effects of Motivated Reasoning on
Political Decision Making, 64 J. POL. 1021, 1023, 1033 (2002) (arguing that motivated
reasoners may discount, counter-argue, or simply ignore new information inconsistent
with their beliefs and demonstrating experimentally that people selectively searched
for information about preferred topics).
76.
Dawson et al., supra note 68, at 1379-80, 1385 (arguing that people
essentially ask themselves, "can I believe this?" when evaluating evidence that
supports a desired conclusion, but ask themselves, "must I believe this?" when
evaluating evidence that is inconsistent with their desired conclusion); Jain &
Maheswaran, supra note 75, at 359 (arguing that less information is required to reach
a preferred conclusion than a nonpreferred conclusion and that motivated reasoners
spend more time looking for alternative explanations when confronted with
information inconsistent with their preferences); Lebo & Cassini, supra note 74, at 723
(noting that people tend to uncritically accept information that is consistent with their
desired outcome while expending effort to counter-argue contrary information).
77.
Eileen Braman & Thomas E. Nelson, Mechanism of Motivated Reasoning?
Analogical Perception in DiscriminationDisputes, 51 AM. J. POL. SC;. 940, 943 (2007)
(noting that motivated reasoning is not unbounded); Kunda, supranote 73, at 482-83.
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an illusion of objectivity-the sense that they are acting rationally
and without bias. 78 This constrains motivated reasoning as people
attempt to construct rationales that they can present (both internally
and externally) as objective.7 9 The illusion of objectivity both limits
motivated reasoning and simultaneously prevents people from
recognizing that their reasoning is biased. People honestly believe
that their beliefs are constructed in a fair and objective manner, free
from bias and self-interest.8 0 Among other things, this means that the
effects of the social psychology model described in this Article are
probably not the result of conscious choices for the majority of
81
people.
Despite being bad at recognizing when our own reasoning is
biased, we are good at identifying when others are engaging in biased
reasoning.8 2 The result is something called naive realism, a situation
where people recognize that others are affected by motivated
reasoning but fail to recognize that they are also subject to it.8 3 Naive
realism can have particularly adverse consequences in situations
where there are contentious disagreements between groups, as each
group perceives itself to be acting objectively while simultaneously

78.
Dawson et al., supra note 68, at 1379, 1386; Jost et al., supra note 74, at
340; Sherman & Cohen, supra note 67, at 220; see Kunda, supra note 73, at 482-83
(arguing that people attempt to construct a justification for their desired conclusion
that they believe would satisfy a dispassionate observer).
79.
Kunda, supra note 73, at 483.
80.
See Braman & Nelson, supra note 77, at 940-41 (noting that judges believe
that the law guides their decision making despite evidence that political preferences
provide a better explanation for judicial outcomes than the law); Gilovich & Griffin,
supra note 66, at 573-74 (arguing that people perceive the world subjectively but
believe that their internal representations of the world mirror objective reality);
Kunda, supra note 73, at 483 (observing that motivated reasoning appears to be
objective to the individual because they do not realize that subconscious bias is
affecting the information they are considering and how they are weighing it); Robert J.
Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: "Nat've Realism" in
Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 415
(1995).
81.
See Braman & Nelson, supra note 77, at 954 (noting that there was no
evidence that any of the subjects in their studies were aware that they were engaging
in motivated reasoning); Kunda, supra note 73, at 483 ('The objectivity of [motivated
reasoning] is illusory because people do not realize that the process is biased by their
goals ....
");Sherman & Cohen, supra note 67, at 188 (noting that self-defensive
reasoning can be unconscious and automatic). See generally John A. Bargh & Tanya L.
Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 462 (1999)
(arguing that people generally use nonconscious mental systems to process information
and interpret their world).
82.
See Kahan, supra note 65, at 5.
83.
See Kahan, supra note 65, at 21-22; Robinson et al., supra note 80, at 404,
414; Sherman & Cohen, supra note 67, at 187-88; David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L.
Cohen, Accepting Threatening Information: Self-Affirmation and the Reduction of
Defensive Biases, II CURRENT DIRECTIONS PYSCHOL. SCI. 119, 119-20 (2002) (describing
how people distort perceived information to maintain a sense of self-worth).
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perceiving the other group as acting subject to biases. This causes
intergroup distrust, tends to polarize the groups' views, and makes it
84
harder for the groups to reconcile their differences.
A particular form of motivated reasoning that has been studied
extensively, and that is relevant to this Article, is self-defensive
reasoning. 5 People tend to have strongly positive self-views 86 and are
motivated to defend those views.8 7 The result is a form of motivated
reasoning where people are likely to reject information that threatens
their sense of self.8 8 Moreover, people's views of themselves are
intricately bound up with their social identities.8 9 Thus attacks on
social or group identities can be treated as attacks on the self that
will trigger the same self-defensive reasoning. 90 As a result, group
9
members are resistant to information that is critical of the group. 1
As noted above, there are links between motivated reasoning and
cognitive biases, and motivated reasoning can amplify the distorting
effects of cognitive biases. It appears that this is partly because
cognitive biases are a mechanism through which motivation distorts
human judgments. 92 Motivated reasoning operates on two levels. It
can bias the information people consider, but it can also bias the
information processing model used. 93 In effect, motivational biases
can cause people to selectively use information processing models
that incorporate cognitive biases when those cognitive biases result in

84.
See Kahan, supra note 65, at 21-22; Robinson et al., supra note 80, at 40405; Sherman & Cohen, supra note 67, at 190-213.
85.
See generally Sherman & Cohen, supra note 67.
86.
Heine, supra note 67, at 766 ("People have a need to view themselves
positively. This is easily the most common and consensually endorsed assumption in
research on the self."); Sherman & Cohen, supra note 67, at 185-86. But see Heine,
supra note 67, at 775-77 (arguing that positive self-views are partly a result of North
American cultural values, and that self-views are not as positively skewed in Japanese
culture); William B. Swann & Jennifer K. Bosson, Self and Identity, in HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 580, 592 (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2009).
87.
Sherman & Cohen, supra note 67, at 187.
88.
See Kahan, supra note 65, at 18 n.95 (noting that goals like our need to
maintain a positive self-image can bias reasoning); Sherman & Cohen, supra note 67,
at 191.
89.
Sherman & Cohen, supra note 67, at 205.
90.
Kahan, supra note 65, at 18 n.96; Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and
Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception,4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 470 (2007); Sherman & Cohen, supra note 67, at 205-06.
91.
Kahan, supra note 90, at 469-70; Sherman & Cohen, supra note 67, at 20810.
92.
Kunda, supra note 73, at 480 (noting that motivation plays a role in
determining which cognitive processes to use); id. at 493 (arguing that motivated
reasoning operates, in part, by activating cognitive biases).
93.
Serena Chen et al., Motivated Heuristic and Systematic Processing, 10
PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 44 (1999).
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a conclusion that favors their directional goals, 9 4 and there is
biases is strongest
experimental evidence that the effect of cognitive
95
when people are pursuing directional goals.
2.

Cognitive Biases

The rest of this section discusses three particular cognitive
biases that appear to influence how affected populations perceive
international criminal courts: heuristics, cognitive dissonance, 96 and
confirmation bias. 97 However, it must be remembered that these
cognitive biases do not operate in a vacuum. Rather, there is reason
to believe that they are operating-most likely subconsciously 9 8-to
bias decision making in favor of a particular goal. In this sense, their
collective use constitutes a form of motivated reasoning. 99 How these
motivational and cognitive biases affect perceptions of the legitimacy
of international criminal courts will be referred to as the social
psychology model, and this model will be used to make and test
predictions about how affected populations perceive courts.
a.

Heuristics

It is undisputed that people do not need to understand an entity
to form an attitude toward it. Indeed, people often form attitudes
toward entities about which they have relatively little information.

94.
See, e.g., id. at 45 (arguing that threats to self-esteem can cause us to
selectively use heuristics over systematic processing because use of heuristics biases
the result in favor of the desired conclusion-affirmation of our self-esteem).
See supra note 71.
95.
96.
While cognitive dissonance is treated in this Article as a cognitive bias, it
has been suggested by some researchers that it is actually a specialized form of
motivated reasoning. See, e.g., Kunda, supra note 73, at 491; Sherman & Cohen, supra
note 67, at 201. While it is true that motivated reasoning can increase the effect of
cognitive dissonance, this Article will follow the majority of researchers that have
treated it as a separate cognitive bias. Having said that, there are obvious similarities
between self-defensive reasoning and how cognitive dissonance is thought to operate in
response to threats to the self. See supra text accompanying notes 85-91, infra notes
114-19 and accompanying text.
97.
There are, of course, lots of other psychological processes that affect our
decision making, including, for example, construal theory. See Gilovich & Griffin, supra
note 66, at 570-71 (describing construal theory). However, due to space limitations,
this Article will confine itself to the subset of psychological processes that seems most
useful in explaining perceptions of international criminal courts.
See supra note 81.
98.
The way in which these cognitive and motivational biases influence
99.
populations affected by violence appears to be a form of what Professor Kahan calls
"cultural cognition," which he defines as the tendency of individuals to conform their
beliefs to those of their culture and their culture's worldview. Kahan, supra note 65, at
23-24.
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This is done through the use of "heuristics." When confronted with
complex decisions or limited information, people often rely upon
mental shortcuts, referred to as heuristics, to come to a decision

without going through the time-consuming and difficult process of
obtaining and evaluating the evidence.' 0 0 Thus there is no reason to
believe that everybody who has an attitude toward an international
criminal court will understand it. In fact, there is good reason to
believe the opposite is true-that most people in an affected
population have an attitude toward their court despite knowing
almost nothing about it.
Evaluating the work of an international criminal court is a
complicated and difficult task that involves consideration of its
negotiating history, constitutive documents, rules of procedure and
evidence, and decisions, among other things. This is not an easy task,
even for people that are already experts in international criminal law.
Thus, one would not expect most people in an affected population to
form a belief about whether a particular court is legitimate by
evaluating factors like the court's institutional structure, its
procedural rules, or the process by which it was created.' 0 1 And
indeed, the evidence demonstrates that the majority of people in
affected populations have definite opinions about the legitimacy of
tribunals despite having very little concrete knowledge about
them.1 02 Despite suggestions to the contrary,1 0 3 this level of ignorance

100.
See Shafir & LeBoeuf, supra note 66, at 492-93. See generally JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos
Tversky eds., 1982). Shafir and LeBeouf point out that our reliance on heuristics can
result in systematic biases and errors that cause people to deviate significantly from a
rational ideal. Shafir & LeBoeuf, supra. Heuristics are not all bad, however. They serve
a useful purpose in many situations by allowing us to conserve cognitive resources.
Gilovich & Griffin, supra note 66, at 566 (noting that people are motivated to minimize
the amount of effort they devote to information processing and thus prefer information
processing models that require less effort over those that require more effort); see also
Chen et al., supra note 93, at 44-45 (noting that people are cognitive misers and that
we prefer to use the least effort necessary to achieve our goals, which in many cases
means preferring the use of heuristics over more systematic information processing).
101.
Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 119
(2007); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion:A Cultural
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1312 (2003); see also Human
Rights Ctr. & Ctr. for Human Rights, supra note 37, at 140 (noting that even judges
and lawyers in the former Yugoslavia knew very little about the ICTY).
102.
See ORENTLICHER, supra note 39, at 88 (noting that in 2005, 72 percent of
Serbs indicated they knew "little" or "very little" about the ICTY); see also Timothy
Longman, The Domestic Impact of the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIALS: MAKING A DIFFERENCE? 33, 37 (Steven R. Ratner
& James L. Bischoff eds., 2004) (finding that only 11 percent of respondents claimed to
be informed or well-informed about the ICTR); infra note 185 (noting that very few
Sierra Leoneans have a good understanding of what the SCSL does or how it operates);
infra note 217 (noting that 15 percent of Cambodians indicated that they had
"moderate" or better knowledge of the ECCC but that only 3 percent of respondents
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is neither surprising nor something that we should expect to change.
Given the complexity of both international criminal courts and
international criminal law, and the nature of human decision making,
it is virtually a foregone conclusion that most people in an affected
population will have opinions about such courts without
understanding them in any detail.
This demonstrates that most people cannot be forming their
opinions about international criminal tribunals based on a direct
evaluation of the factors that most commentators suggest influence
perceptions of courts.10 4 Of course, people might still be influenced by
these factors indirectly if the things that do influence their opinions
are themselves based on these factors. For example, if people formed
their opinions about courts based on the advice of experts who based
their own conclusions on factors such as how the court was created,
its institutional structure, or its procedures, then opinions within the
affected population could be driven by those factors even though most
of the affected population was unaware of them. However, this does
not appear to be the case. As the next section demonstrates, in
certain common circumstances, the manner in which a court is
perceived is largely a function of whom it indicts and whether that
indictment contradicts dominant narratives within large sections of
the affected population.
b.

Cognitive Dissonance

Cognitive dissonance theory l0 5 offers an explanation as to why
some affected populations might perceive a tribunal as biased and

could correctly identify the five individuals who had been charged by the court); infra
note 240 (noting that only 4 percent of respondents indicated that they were "well
informed" about the Regulation 64 Panels in Kosovo). This result is not unique to
international criminal courts, and a similar effect is present in the United States. For
example, most Americans have strong opinions about the Supreme Court despite
knowing very little about it. See Kahan, supra note 65, at 6 n.21, 29 n.147.
103.
See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales, supra note 1, at 37 (suggesting that a relatively
low literacy rate and lack of access to information about the court may have led to
citizens' lack of understanding of the Special Court for Sierra Leone).
See supra notes 13-18 (listing the factors that most commentators believe
104.
influence perceptions of international criminal courts).
105.
The operation of cognitive dissonance was first demonstrated in the 1950s
by Leon Festinger. E.g., Festinger & Carlsmith, supra note 72, at 209. Dissonance
theory has subsequently been described as "the most important single development in
the history of social psychology." Elliott Aronson, Back to the Future: Retrospective
Review of Leon Festinger's "A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance," 110 AM. J. PSYCHOL.
127, 129 (1997) (book review). It remains a vigorous field of psychological research. See,
e.g., Louisa C. Egan et al., The Origins of Cognitive Dissonance: Evidence from
Children and Monkeys, 18 PSYCHOL. SC. 978 (2007) (demonstrating that children and
nonhuman primates change their current preferences to match their previous
behaviors). But see Daryl J. Bem, Self-Perception: An Alternative Interpretation of
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unjust without considering whether it is actually biased and
unjust.'0 6 Cognitive dissonance is the uncomfortable feeling caused
by simultaneously having conflicting thoughts or beliefs.1 0 7 People
are motivated to reduce dissonance through various dissonance
reduction strategies, including attitude change, the addition of
consonant cognitions, diminishing the importance of the dissonant
cognitions, repression of the dissonant cognition, passive forgetting,
misattribution of the dissonance, self-affirmation, and attitude
108
bolstering.
In the case of the ICTY, this Article posits that cognitive
dissonance operated in the following way among many ethnic
Serbians. The dominant internal narrative of ethnic Serbians
immediately after the conflict in the Balkans is best described as "we
were not responsible."'10 9 The ICTY charged large numbers of ethnic

Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena, 74 PSYCHOL. REV. 183, 196-97 (1967) (arguing that
most of the early studies purporting to demonstrate cognitive dissonance "could be
accounted for without postulating an aversive motivational drive"). Bem's alternative
explanation for the phenomena of cognitive dissonance studies has not stood the test of
time. See Andrew J. Elliot & Patricia G. Devine, On the Motivational Nature of
Cognitive Dissonance: Dissonance as Psychological Discomfort, 67 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 382, 390 (1994) ("The present pattern of data does not support the
alternative hypothesis based on self-perception theory."); Eddie Harmon-Jones et al.,
Evidence that the Production of Aversive Consequences Is Not Necessary to Create
Cognitive Dissonance, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 11, 13 (1996) (arguing
that self-perception theory cannot adequately explain the results of dissonance
experiments).
106.
And also without regard to any of the factors that scholars say should drive
perceptions of the legitimacy of international criminal courts. For a discussion of these
factors, see supranotes 13-18.
107.
To put it in more technical terms: "The term cognitive dissonance describes
a psychological state in which an individual's cognitions-eliefs, attitudes, and
behaviors-are at odds. People experience cognitive dissonance as aversive, and are
motivated to resolve the inconsistency between their discrepant cognitions." Egan,
supra note 105, at 978 (citations omitted). Other definitions are similar. See, e.g., Elliot
& Devine, supra note 105, at 382 ("[T]he perception of an inconsistency among an
individual's cognitions generates a negative interpersonal state (dissonance), which
motivates the individual to seek and implement a strategy to alleviate this aversive
state.").
108.
Elliot & Devine, supra note 105, at 390-91; see also Bertram Gawronski &
Fritz Strack, On the Propositional Nature of Cognitive Consistency: Dissonance
Changes Explicit but Not Implicit Attitudes, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 535,
536 (2004) (arguing that individuals reduce dissonance between two or more
propositions "either by explicitly rejecting one proposition as being false or by finding
an additional proposition that resolves the inconsistency"); Jeff Stone & Joel Cooper, A
Self-Standards Model of Cognitive Dissonance, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
228, 231-32 (2001) (describing competing theories of the self in the cognitive
dissonance process).
•109.
See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text. Denial of responsibility is
itself a dissonance reduction mechanism. Patrick Gosling et al., Denial of
Responsibility: A New Mode of Dissonance Reduction, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 722, 722 (2006). So, for example, ethnic Serbs confronted with evidence of the
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Serbians, including many Serbian cultural and political elites, with
serious violations of international criminal law and attributed
responsibility for the worst atrocities primarily to Serbians. 110 In
effect, the ICTY said, "Serbians were responsible." This directly
contradicted the "we were not responsible" narrative and induced
cognitive dissonance. This cognitive dissonance caused mental
discomfort for ethnic Serbians, which they were motivated to reduce.
They reduced the dissonance by rejecting the ICTY's attribution of
responsibility. This rejection was rationalized by an attitude change
in that they perceived the ICTY as being anti-Serb and biased.1 1 ' If
the ICTY was biased and unreliable, its accusations against Serbs
could be discounted and the dissonance and accompanying mental
discomfort were reduced.
This reasoning is consistent with our understanding of cognitive
dissonance. First, not all inconsistent cognitions give rise to cognitive
dissonance. Inconsistent cognitions have to produce affective
feelings-essentially an emotional reaction'1 2 -before
cognitive
dissonance will occur.11 3 However, people generally have very
114
favorable self-views and are protective of their self-views.
Consequently, cognitions that are inconsistent with one's self-concept

can

produce

powerful

cognitive

dissonance. 115

Social

identity,

commission of atrocities by other ethnic Serbs could reduce the cognitive dissonance
this evidence would likely produce by rejecting responsibility for the atrocities. Indeed,
there is widespread evidence in public opinion surveys that ethnic Serbs did deny
responsibility for atrocities committed by other Serbs. See supra notes 39-44. There is
also evidence that this tendency is a more or less universal aspect of human nature.
See infra Part IV.A.
110.
See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
111.
See, e.g., Human Rights Ctr. & Ctr. for Human Rights, supra note 37, at
146 (concluding that ethnic Serb lawyers and judges in Bosnia labeled the ICTY
"political" and biased, in part, to "delegitimize the Tribunal" and "dismiss its
judgments as the result of a legal charade").
112.
Technically, affective feelings are "valenced subjective experiences that
may or may not be directly related to an object," and usually take the form of "moods,
emotions and other affective experiences." Rainer Greifeneder et al., When Do People
Rely on Affective and Cognitive Feelings in Judgment? A Review, 20 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 107, 108 (2010).
113.
Dolores Albarracin & Patrick Vargas, Attitudes and Persuasion: From
Biology to Social Responses to PersuasiveIntent, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY,
supra note 86, at 394, 417.
114.
David C. Matz & Wendy Wood, Cognitive Dissonance in Groups: The
Consequences of Disagreement, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 22, 23 (2005);
William B. Swann & Jennifer K. Bosson, Self and Identity, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 86, at 580, 592; see also supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
115.
See Aronson, supra note 105, at 131 ("In my judgment, dissonance is
greatest and clearest when what is involved is not just any two cognitions but, rather,
a cognition about the self and a piece of our behavior that violates that self-concept.").
Obviously, motivated reasoning also plays a role here. People are motivated to protect
their sense of self, including their group identity, and thus are motivated to reach an
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Thus,

statements that were inconsistent with the dominant internal
narrative within the ethnic Serb community were treated as attacks
on Serbian social identity and thus on self-views, which produced the
affective feelings necessary for the activation of cognitive
dissonance.

117

It is important that each of the main ethnic groups in the former
118
Yugoslavia identified strongly with one of the sides in the conflict.
Thus, ethnic Serbs identified very strongly with the Serb "side" in the
conflict, and the majority of them treated the indictment of Serbian
political and military leaders by the ICTY as an attack on ethnic Serb
identity. 119 Had ethnic Serbs not identified strongly with the Serb
"side" in the conflict, the indictment of Serb political and military
leaders might not have been treated as an attack on Serbian ethnic
identity. 120 If that were the case, they would probably not have
produced the affective feelings necessary to induce cognitive
121
dissonance.
Second, the mechanism of dissonance reduction identified above
is consistent with what we know of cognitive dissonance. The
dissonance occurs because of the conflict between the internal
Serbian narrative of "we were not responsible" and the ICTY's
assertion of responsibility. There are two obvious ways that this
dissonance could be reduced. One is to rationalize the ICTY as antiSerb and unreliable and therefore reject the ICTY's attribution of

outcome that is consistent with protecting their sense of self. In effect, cognitive
dissonance is the mechanism by which motivated reasoning occurs.
116.
Demis E. Glasford et al., Intragroup Dissonance: Responses to Ingroup
Violation of PersonalValues, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1057, 1058 (2008).
117.
Dissonance may be created by the behavior of groups to which one belongs
because individuals derive part of their self-concept from group membership. Id.; see
also Michael J. Wohl & Nyla R. Branscombe, Forgiveness and Collective Guilt
Assignment to Historical Perpetrator Groups Depend on Level of Social Category
Inclusiveness, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 288, 288 (2005) (noting that even
remembering transgressions committed against a group decades or centuries before
can provoke intense emotional responses in group members); supra text accompanying
notes 90-91.
118.
See supra note 35.
119.
Several of the sources cited above include very defensive statements by
ethnic Serbs that treat the ICTY's prosecution of Serb leaders as a direct attack on
what it means to be Serbian. See, e.g., Toncic, supra note 41 ("The process against
Milosevic is scandalous. It's another attempt to portray the Serbian people as prone to
genocide.").
120.
See Daniel Bar-Tal et al., A Sense of Self-Perceived Victimhood in
Intractable Conflicts, 91 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 229, 234-35 (2009) (noting that whether
group members feel distress or a sense of victimization from the suffering of other
group members depends largely on whether they identify strongly with the group).
121.
This issue is explored further in the context of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone. See infra notes 208-18 and accompanying text.
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responsibility; the other would be to accept that Serbs did bear
significant responsibility for the crimes charged at the ICTY. Either
change would eliminate the inconsistency between the cognitions.
However, people are very protective of their positive self-views, and
strongly endorsed attitudes are highly resistant to dissonance-related
attitude change. 12 2 Thus one would not expect the "we were not
responsible" narrative to change in response to cognitive dissonance,
and studies have shown that a large percentage of ethnic Serbs
continue to believe that Serbs did not commit any crimes during the
Balkan conflict. 123 On the other hand, one would not expect many
ethnic Serbs to be heavily invested in the legitimacy of the ICTY.
Consequently, one would predict that attitudes to the ICTY would be
more likely to change in response to the dissonance than Serbian selfviews. And indeed, attitudes toward the ICTY among ethnic Serbs
were extremely negative.
Two possible criticisms of this theory might be: (1) cognitive
dissonance cannot be activated by perceived attacks on one's social
identity and (2) most Serbs did not anticipate any direct adverse
consequences of the ICTY's position and thus were not sufficiently
motivated to engage in cognitive dissonance. However, neither
criticism withstands scrutiny. Much dissonance research has taken
place using a forced compliance model, which has generally involved
forcing people to act inconsistently with their beliefs to cause
dissonance. However, an act is not necessary for cognitive dissonance,
which can result solely from the receipt of external information that
produces inconsistent cognitions. 124 Furthermore, one does not have
to anticipate any adverse consequences from inconsistent cognitions
to experience dissonance and subsequent attitude change. 125 Simply
possessing inconsistent cognitions can result in dissonance. 12 6 Thus,
our current understanding of cognitive dissonance can explain why
ethnic Serbs tended to view the ICTY negatively.
Another potential problem with this theory in the ICTY context
is that cognitive dissonance occurs at the individual level (and is
generally studied at the individual level), but this Article is concerned
primarily with effects at the group level. Nevertheless, recent
research into the effects of cognitive dissonance on group beliefs
suggests that group dynamics might reinforce initial negative
perceptions. First of all, group attitudes are affected by cognitive
dissonance, and interacting with a group member that has opposing

122.
1060.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Elliot & Devine, supra note 105, at 387; Glasford et al., supra note 116, at
See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
Harmon-Jones et al., supranote 105, at 14.
Id. at 9, 11, 13-14.
Id.

2012]

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGYAND PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY

431

viewpoints can cause dissonance and invoke dissonance-reduction
strategies. 12 7 In other words, if your views are different from the
group, cognitive dissonance can cause your attitudes to change so
that they are more consistent with those of the group. 128 This
suggests an explanation for how initial negative perceptions might
tend to propagate through an affected population. If most of one's
neighbors, friends, coworkers, and family members perceive the court
negatively, then you are more likely to do the same as a dissonance
reduction method. This effect would operate alongside the dissonance
caused by the ICTY's perceived attack on Serbian ethnic identity.
The widespread use of heuristics might also compound an initial
negative perception induced by cognitive dissonance, or propagate
that negative perception to group members that were not initially
affected by cognitive dissonance. 129 Common heuristics include
sampling the views of our associates and deferring to the opinion of
experts we trust. 130 We tend to associate with and trust those who
share our cultural outlook, 131 and we tend to impute credibility to
putative experts that share our cultural outlook. 132 Thus, it comes as
no surprise that group membership influences the values of the
group's members.

133

Most ethnic Serbs would probably be motivated to find a reason
to reject the ICTY's attribution of responsibility and preserve their
social identity. At the same time, most ethnic Serbs would not have
made (nor would they have been able to make) an independent
evaluation of the legitimacy of the ICTY. 13 4 Instead, they are likely to
have relied on the opinions of those they trust, including friends,
family, neighbors, and "experts" who share their cultural outlook,

127.
Matz & Wood, supra note 114, at 27, 29.
128.
Of course, this is not always the case. If an individual's identification with
the group is low but their identification with their own contrary view is high, then the
dissonance might be reduced by lowering one's identification with the group rather
than changing one's attitude. Glasford et al., supra note 115, at 1060. However, the
number of ethnic Serbs that identified more strongly with the ICTY than with their
own ethnic identity seems likely to have been small. See supra Part II.A.
129.
Heuristics are also discussed supra Part II.B.2.a.
130.
Kahan, supra note 101, at 119.
131.
Kahan & Braman, supra note 101, at 1314; see also Matz & Wood, supra
note 114, at 35 ("Attitudinal homogeneity is a natural state of many real-world groups
because of self-selection processes in group formation, especially the tendencies to form
relationships with similar others and with others who are in close physical proximity
and thus are subject to similar external forces.").
132.
Kahan, supra note 101, at 121.
133.
Id. at 120-21 ("Individuals generally conform their beliefs to those held by
their associates-both because those are the persons from whom they obtain most of
their information and because those are the ones whose respect they most desire.").
134.
ORENTLICHER, supra note 39, at 88 (noting that in 2005, 72 percent of.
Serbs indicated they knew "little" or "very little" about the ICTY).
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most of whom are likely to be other ethnic Serbs. 135 This would create
an "echo chamber" effect where initial negative perceptions of the
ICTY were reflected back by associates and elites. Indeed, there is
widespread evidence that Serb political, cultural, and media elites
vilified the ICTY.1 36 In this way, a widespread reliance on heuristics
137
could reinforce initial negative perceptions.
Ultimately, it is hard to reconcile Serb attitudes and the
evidence produced by the trials at the ICTY without invoking some
decidedly biased thought process. Nearly 40 percent of ethnic Serbs
apparently believe that no Serb committed crimes during the Balkan
conflict despite the overwhelming evidence of Serb involvement in
crimes, including many confessions by Serb perpetrators.13 8 This
disconnect can only be explained by a powerful nonobjective process,
and the combination of motivated reasoning, heuristics, and cognitive
dissonance is a plausible explanation. 139 Believing that the ICTY was
biased and anti-Serb became a mechanism by which the dominant
internal narrative within the Serb population was preserved. The
result was negative perceptions of the legitimacy of the ICTY.

135.
See Klarin, supra note 38, at 90 ("Public perception [of the ICTY] is
influenced to a much greater extent by the views of the local political, academic and
cultural elites ... and by the manner in which the local media depict
proceedings .. "); see also Human Rights Ctr. & Ctr. for Human Rights, supra note
37, at 140 (noting that legal professionals in the former Yugoslavia reported receiving
virtually all information about the ICTY from local sources despite being aware that
those local sources were biased by their ethnic orientation).
136.
Anti-ICTY feelings were encouraged by Serb politicians, some of whom had
already been indicted by the ICTY. See ORENTLICHER, supra note 39, at 11-12
(describing the anti-ICTY sentiment of nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic and his
immediate successor Vojislav Kostunica); Klarin, supra note 38, at 90-91 (noting the
influence of Serbian military and political elites in the shaping of public perception of
the ICTY).
137.
The use of heuristics would not necessarily create negative perceptions of
international criminal courts among affected populations. Indeed, in an affected group
that is predisposed to view the court positively, like ethnic Bosniaks, one would expect
that relying on the views of associates and trusted experts would tend to reinforce
positive perceptions of the court.
138.
See infra notes 346-50. On the other hand, not all Serbs deny the evidence
of crimes. Polls have shown that roughly half of Serbs agree that massacre at
Srebrenica took place and that 43 percent thought it was a crime. Klarin, supra note
38, at 93. Moreover, acceptance of Serb responsibility appears to be growing slowly over
time. ORENTLICHER, supra note 39, at 87. But Srebrenica is one of the most serious and
well documented atrocities. Ethnic Serbs were much less likely to acknowledge that
Kosovo Albanians were the victims of crimes in the run-up to the NATO bombing of
Serbia, with only 14 percent of ethnic Serbs believing that crimes had occurred. Klarin,
supra note 38, at 93.
139.
It cannot be explained by simple ignorance of what happened during the
conflict as Serb knowledge of the conflict is highly selective in nature. Polls have shown
that huge majorities (between 75 and 90 percent) of ethnic Serbs are aware of and
believe that crimes were committed against ethnic Serbs during the conflict. Klarin,
supranote 38, at 93.
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Perceptions of the ICTY in the former Yugoslavia are driven to a
large degree by whom the court indicts and whether these
indictments contradict the dominant internal narratives within the
various affected populations. 140 The fundamental problem appears to
be a mismatch between the dominant internal narrative within the
Serb community and what actually happened in the former
Yugoslavia. It is this mismatch that led to negative perceptions of the
ICTY among ethnic Serbs when the court overwhelmingly indicted
Serbians. 141 This suggests that courts will not be able to achieve a
positive perception among groups that perceive them negatively until
the mismatch can be eliminated. In practice, this means that courts
will not be perceived in a positive light until group members accept
responsibility for crimes committed by their group during the
conflict.142

c.

Confirmation Bias

When courts are identified as suffering from negative perceived
legitimacy among affected populations, the suggested remedy is often
more and better outreach. 143 For example, the ICTY did little or no
outreach work in Serbia until 1999, despite the fact that Serbian
media was filled with lies and distortions about the work of the
ICTY. 144 Those who have criticized the ICTY for poor perceptions of

140.

This, more than anything else, explains why

positive attitudes toward the ICTY have tended to correlate with the degree to
which the ICTY has prosecuted perpetrators who committed atrocities against
members of the survey respondents' own ethnic communities and to correlate
negatively with the degree to which subjects prosecuted by the ICTY come from
respondents' ethnic group.
ORENTLICHER, supra note 39, at 49; see also deGuzman, supra note 1, at 1446-49

(noting that perceptions of legitimacy among affected populations are likely to be
driven by decisions about who to indict).
141.
See Human Rights Ctr. & Ctr. for Human Rights, supra note 37, at 147148 (noting that ethnic Croats and Serbs in Bosnia viewed themselves as victims but
the international community viewed them as aggressors, and that the "disparity" in
these viewpoints led to negative attitudes toward the ICTY when its prosecutorial
strategy validated the international position).
142.
This point is addressed in more detail infra Part IV.C-E.
143.
See Higonnet, supra note 6, at 423-26 (arguing that the ICTY did not place
enough emphasis on outreach); Ramji-Nogales, supra note 1, at 28 (suggesting that
negative perceptions of the ICTY and ICTR were the result of lack of knowledge about
the tribunals); Stromseth, supra note 7, at 268-69, 274 (arguing that a lack of
outreach, failure to indict particular leaders, and limited contributions to building
domestic judicial capacity undercut the legitimacy of the ICTY).
144.
See ORENTLICHER, supra note 39, at 95-96 (noting that delayed outreach
efforts made it more difficult to dismantle well-established misperceptions and
propaganda); Klarin, supra note 38, at 96 (suggesting that the ICTY's Outreach
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legitimacy among ethnic Serbs have sometimes suggested that the
solution should have been a robust ICTY outreach program in Serbia
from the very beginning. 14 5 Underlying these arguments is a belief
that negative perceptions of a court are driven by lack of impartial
information and that outreach can educate the population and
improve perceptions of the court. 146 However, as the discussion above
indicates, the problem is not lack of impartial information, and, as
this section illustrates, simply providing more information about how
the court works is not likely to be the solution.
Confirmation bias' 4 7 refers to the tendency for people to search
for, interpret, and remember information in a way that systematically

impedes their ability to reject a preexisting hypothesis. 148 In other

words, under certain circumstances people tend to search for, recall,
and interpret information in a way that has a tendency to confirm
their existing beliefs. 149 The effect is stronger when the preexisting

Programme implemented in 1999 was ill-equipped to combat the powerful propaganda
machines already in place).
See, e.g., Stromseth, supra note 7, at 274 ("If the ICTY had provided Serbs
145.
with a clearer idea of its operations and purpose, early on, they might have been less
prone to view the tribunal so skeptically.").
146.
See Laurel E. Fletcher, From Indifference to Engagement: Bystanders and
InternationalCriminalJustice, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1013, 1043-44 (2005) (arguing that
the ICTYs outreach efforts were predicated on the belief that "citizens would be more
supportive of the court if they understood how the court worked as an adjudicative
body"). She notes that this approach failed to acknowledge that many people rejected
the court's work because of its indictments against individuals with whom they shared
an ethnic identity, rather than because of lack of information. Id. at 1044.
While some researchers treat confirmation bias as only the study of
147.
whether people selectively search for information and assign other names to the
selective interpretation and remembrance of information, this Article will follow those
who have used the term confirmation bias to refer generally to all three processes. See
Raymond S. Nickerson, ConfirmationBias: A UbiquitousPhenomenon in Many Guises,
2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998) ("Confirmation bias has been used in the
psychological literature to refer to a variety of phenomena. Here I take the term to
represent a generic concept that subsumes several more specific ideas that connote the
inappropriate bolstering of hypotheses or beliefs whose truth is in question.").
148.
Margit E. Oswald & Stefan Grosjean, Confirmation Bias, in COGNITIVE
ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGMENT AND
MEMORY 79, 79 (Rudiger Pohl ed., 2004).
See generally Nickerson, supra note 147, at 177 ("A great deal of empirical
149.
evidence supports the idea that the confirmation bias is extensive and strong and that
it appears in many guises."). Nickerson goes on to summarize that empirical evidence.
Id. at 177-89. In contrast, Oswald and Grosjean offer a critique of the existing
literature on confirmation bias and suggest that the evidence for it is not strong where
people are exposed to a neutral hypothesis or where the costs of being wrong are
particularly high. Oswald & Grosjean, supra note 148, at 81-90. They also argue that a
positive test strategy is often the most effective one, even if it does under certain
circumstances lead to confirmation bias (for example, where the true answer is a
subset of the hypothesis being tested). Id. at 88-90; see also Joshua Klayman & YoungWon Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94
PSYCHOL. REV. 211, 218-20 (1987) (arguing that positive test strategies are often a
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belief relates to an issue that has a strong affective response. 150 Thus,
one would expect confirmation bias to occur when studying
perceptions of international criminal courts because of the strong
affective feelings produced by indictments among members of the
affected population that identify with the indictees. 151
Biased assimilation of new information is also particularly
strong when the belief under challenge is one that is predominant
within a group. 152 This biased processing of information may in part
be a result of cultural or social groups acting as a de facto filter of the
information that group members receive. 153 If the source of the new
information is someone perceived to hold cultural commitments
contrary to one's own, then there is intense pressure to reject that
information. 154 Thus, one would predict that confirmation bias would
affect perceptions of the legitimacy of international criminal courts in
situations where affected groups have dominant internal narratives
about responsibility for the conflict that are at odds with the court's
attribution of responsibility. In short, there is good reason to believe
that confirmation bias will affect how affected populations perceive
155
international criminal courts.

useful heuristic device and not evidence of a negative confirmation bias). Nevertheless,
Oswald and Grosjean concede that studies have shown the existence of confirmation
bias in situations where confirmation of a preexisting hypothesis will result in positive
emotions and the cost of being wrong is low. Oswald & Grosjean, supra note 148, at 9093. Opinions about international criminal courts seem to be such a situation.
Confirmation of preexisting negative (or positive) perceptions of the court is associated
with positive emotions (confirming "we are not responsible" or "we were the victims"
respectively) and being wrong about the court has a low cost, particularly in a situation
where most people one knows share the same opinion about the court.
150.
Charles S. Taber & Milton Lodge, Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation
of Political Beliefs, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 755, 756-57, 760 (2006). Taber and Lodge also
reported stronger confirmation bias among sophisticated participants-those who had
the most preexisting knowledge about the subject matter. Id. This suggests that
."experts" may be particularly susceptible to confirmation bias. See also Shafir &
LeBoeuf, supra note 66, at 502 (noting that experts are just as prone to information
processing errors as nonexperts).
151.
See supra notes 120-23.
152.
Kahan, supra note 101, at 123.
153.
See Nickerson, supranote 147, at 199 ("People tend to associate, on a longterm basis, with people who think more or less as they do on matters important to
them; they read authors with whom they tend to agree, listen to news commentators
who interpret current events in a way that they like, and so on.").
154.
Kahan, supranote 101, at 122.
155.
Of course, not everyone exhibits confirmation bias. For example, in Wason's
seminal study of confirmation bias, six of his twenty-nine subjects guessed the correct
rule on the first try and also exhibited a statistically significant use of negative testing
strategies to falsify their original hypothesis. Wason, supra note 68, at 138. In addition,
not everyone who exhibits confirmation bias does so to the same degree. Taber &
Lodge, supra note 150, at 765-67.
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There is an obvious connection between confirmation bias and
cognitive dissonance, as both may be the result of motivated
reasoning. 156 In cognitive dissonance, when an individual is
confronted with inconsistent cognitions, he or she tries to preserve
the preferred belief, which often results in an attitude change about
the disfavored belief that permits the dissonance to be reduced. 15 7 In
the context of this Article, that usually means concluding that a court
is unfair or biased as a means to reject the court's attribution of
responsibility for atrocities. Confirmation bias can also be the result
of motivated reasoning. If an individual is motivated to believe that
an international criminal court is biased or unfair, then that
individual will selectively review, interpret, and remember
information about the court in a way that tends to confirm or even
strengthen the negative attitude toward the court. Thus, information
that one would expect to undermine the belief that a court is biased
(evidence that ethnic Serbs were responsible for atrocities or evidence
that the trials at the ICTY were fair) is ignored, discounted,
forgotten, or treated as if it supports the belief that the court is
biased. As a result, confirmation bias may make it very difficult to
overcome the initial negative predisposition. The usual prescriptionmore and better outreach to counter misperceptions of the work of the
court-might not make things better and might actually make things
worse, as the example of the ICTY demonstrates.
Confirmation bias results in three principal effects, each of which
will be discussed below: (1) attitude polarization, (2) the primacy
effect, and (3) belief perseverance. First, attitude polarization occurs
when exposure to evidence that does not support one's belief actually
strengthens the preexisting belief. 158 This effect appears to be more
pronounced when the issue is one that has a strong affective
response. 15 9 There is some evidence of attitude polarization in the
former Yugoslavia. Two surveys in 2003 and 2004 assessed the
impact of exposure to ICTY trials on ethnic Serbs. While the number

156. See Nickerson, supra note 147, at 176 ("People may treat evidence in a
biased way when they are motivated by the desire to defend beliefs that they wish to
maintain."); supra notes 92-95.
See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
157.
One famous study found that exposure to an equal mix of supportive and
158.
nonsupportive evidence actually strengthened an individual's belief in a preexisting
hypothesis. Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and
Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered
Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099, 2105-08 (1979); see also
Oswald & Grosjean, supra note 148, at 89-90 (describing Lord's 1979 study and
discussing the process of differential weighing conducted by individuals who have a
preexisting hypothesis and who are confronted with new data); David P. Redlawsk,
Andrew J. W. Civettini & Karen M. Emmerson, The Affective Tipping Point: Do
Motivated Reasoners Ever "Get It'?, 31 POL. PSYCHOL. 563, 578-79 (2010).
159.
Taber & Lodge, supranote 150, at 765-67.
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of people who changed their minds after watching ICTY proceedings
was small in both surveys, large majorities of those who did change
160
their minds ended up holding more negative views of the court.
This is what we would expect from attitude polarization.
Second, confirmation bias can also cause people to treat
information received earlier as more important than information
received later. 16 1 This is called the primacy effect. To put it another
way, the primacy effect demonstrates that first impressions really do
color the way in which people interpret the evidence that supports a
proposition. The primacy effect would thus favor retention of the
initial negative perception. The obvious evidence of the primacy effect
in this case is that Serb attitudes toward the ICTY have remained
largely unchanged over the ICTY's lifetime, despite evidence that
should have undermined that negative attitude.
Third, belief perseverance occurs when a belief persists even
after the evidence supporting that belief has been conclusively
demonstrated to be false. 162 Belief perseverance could cause negative
perception of the ICTY to persist even in the face of overwhelming
evidence that the court was largely fair and just. There is ample
evidence of belief perseverance in Serbian attitudes toward
responsibility for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, as a
significant minority of Serbs continues to believe that Serbs were not
responsible for any crimes despite overwhelming evidence that this is
not true.

16 3

All of this is consistent with what one would expect from
confirmation bias. In this context, it seems unlikely that any amount
of well-planned outreach would have been able to cause a positive
perception of the ICTY among ethnic Serbs, at least during its
lifespan. 164 Thus, while it is true that the ICTY was slow to begin an

160.
ORENTLICHER, supra note 39, at 88 n.407.
161.
See Nickerson, supra note 147, at 187 ("People often form an opinion early
in the process and then evaluate subsequently acquired information in a way that is
partial to that opinion.").
162.
Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On
the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 100, at 129, 146-51; see also
Nickerson, supra note 147, at 187 (surveying studies demonstrating a "primacy effect"
(when individuals overweight familiar information) and explaining its close
relationship to "beliefpersistence" (when individuals resist changing familiar beliefs)).
163.
Supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
164.
ORENTLICHER, supra note 39, at 96-97 (arguing that even an early and
robust ICTY outreach program would not have had much impact on Serb perceptions of
the court).
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outreach program, it does not follow that a much earlier outreach
165
program would have led to a different result.
Of course, not all affected populations will be predisposed to view
the tribunal negatively. Some groups will likely be predisposed to
view the tribunal positively. In such a situation, confirmation bias
effectively works to support positive perceptions. An individual with a
positive perception of a court will probably favor information that

supports

this

perception

while

selectively

remembering

and

interpreting contrary information in a way that minimizes its
impact. 166 In effect, courts may have difficulty changing the initial
167
predispositions of the affected groups.
This also casts doubt on the narrative that some courts have

been particularly effective at outreach efforts (as measured by
perceptions of the tribunal).168 For example, one would expect
Cambodians to view the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (ECCC) favorably and for confirmation bias to reinforce
that view. 16 9 Of course, the ECCC also had a robust outreach effort
compared to the initial efforts at the ad hoc courts. 170 But it does not

A corollary to this point is that if the tribunal cannot have much impact on
165.
negative perceptions, then perceptions of legitimacy cannot be a good way to measure
the tribunal's success,
166.
See supra note 147 (discussing the functioning of confirmation bias
generally).
Of course, there is a limit to the effect of motivated reasoning, confirmation
167.
bias and cognitive dissonance. For a discussion of the limits of motivated reasoning, see
infra Part IV.D.
168.
See, e.g., Stromseth, supra note 7, at 304-05 (arguing that the SCSL was
perceived positively because of its early and systematic outreach efforts).
See infra Part III.B for a discussion of Cambodian attitudes toward the
169.
ECCC.
During the ECCC's first trial, that of Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch), more
170.
than 23,000 Cambodians came to watch the trial proceedings. Press Release,
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Presentation of Evidence in the
"Duch-trial" Concluded (Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/
default/files/media/ECCCPressRelease_17_Sep_2009_Eng.pdf. In addition, the ECCC
has had a robust public outreach capacity. For example, on March 1, 2010, officials
from the ECCC met with more than 7,000 Phnom Penh high school students to
increase awareness and understanding of the ECCC among Cambodian students. 7,000
Students and Teachers Briefed About the ECCC, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS COURTS
CAMBODIA (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/7000-students-andteachers-briefed-about-eccc. This outreach program was done as part of a nationwide
program of visits by ECCC officials to schools. The school outreach program is itself
part of an even broader outreach program that is described in more detail on the ECCC
website. This outreach includes attendance at town hall meetings and bringing people
to the ECCC to attend hearings. 32,633 Persons Visited ECCC in 2010,
30,
2010),
(Dec.
COURTS
CAMBODIA
CHAMBERS
EXTRAORDINARY
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/sites/default/files/reports/eccc 30 dec_-2010_eng.pdf. This
capacity has been enhanced by cooperation with local NGOs that also engage in public
outreach programs. For example, the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), a
prominent local NGO, has an ambitious program to help up to 10,000 victims of the
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follow that positive perceptions of the ECCC are a direct result of
those outreach efforts any more than negative perceptions of the
ICTY among ethnic Serbs were a result of the ICTY's lack of outreach
efforts. The ECCC may simply be getting credit for something that
171
was going to happen anyway.
C. Other Factors That Affect Perceived Legitimacy
While this Article argues that under certain circumstances
motivational and cognitive biases have a large effect on how affected
populations perceive international criminal courts, it is clear that
attitudes are not driven entirely by these biases. For example, there
have been detailed studies of public perceptions of the ICTY in Serbia
by journalists, law professors, and political scientists. They all
identify various specific events that have affected perceptions of the
ICTY over the years. These events include, among other things: the
overthrow of Slobodan Milosevi6 by reformers, NATO's bombing of
Serbia in 1999, the potential loss of international aid if Serbia did not
hand over ICTY indictees, EU negotiations for Serbian accession, the
assassination of Zoran Djindjic in 2003, and video of a Serb
paramilitary unit executing Bosniak men at Srebrenica. 172 There is
no doubt that these factors affected how the ICTY was perceived, but
the magnitude of their effect appears to be much smaller than the
effect stemming from motivated reasoning-they had modest impacts
on how much the ICTY was disliked but none of them changed the
underlying dislike and distrust of the ICTY among ethnic Serbs.
Factors like a court's institutional structure and its outreach
efforts seem to have an even smaller effect than political events. For

Khmer Rouge regime file the necessary paperwork with the court to be formally
recognized as civil parties so that they can participate in the proceedings. History,
DOCUMENTATION
CENTER
CAMBODIA
(DC-CAM),
http://www.dccam.org/#/
theorganizationhistory (last visited Mar. 1, 2012); Victim ParticipationProject (VPA),
DOCUMENTATION CENTER CAMBODIA (DC-CAM), http://www.d.dccam.orglProjects/
Tribunal ResponseTeam/VictimParticipationNictimParticipation.htm (last visited
Mar. 1, 2012). In addition, DC-Cam has outreach programs directed toward
communities particularly affected by the Khmer Rouge, like the Cham Muslim
communities. See, e.g., Farina So, Website Development: Building Bridges Between the
Cambodian Cham Muslim Community and the Rest of the World, DOCUMENTATION
CENTER CAMBODIA (DC-CAM), http://www.d.dccam.org/Projects/PublicInfofBuilding_
BridgesBetween.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (describing website outreach program
concerning the Cham Muslim communities).
171.
In fact, the positive perceptions of the ECCC seem to exist despite evidence
that suggests a lack of moral and legal legitimacy in some areas. See infra Part 1II.B
(discussing political interference by the Cambodian government in the decision making
of Cambodian judges at the ECCC).
172.
See ORENTLICHER, supra note 39, at 30-51, 65, 103-06; Klarin, supra note
38, at 91-94; Shaw, supra note 38, at 15, 20.
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example, none of the above analyses of Serb attitudes toward the
ICTY placed great emphasis on institutional structure or outreach
efforts in explaining perceptions of the ICTY. Indeed, there are both
theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that factors like
institutional structure and outreach efforts do not have much impact
on attitudes toward international criminal courts. 173 In short, while
there are undoubtedly many factors that affect how affected
populations perceive a tribunal, the principal factor appears to be
whom the court indicts and whether the indictments contradict the
dominant internal narrative of the various affected groups.
D. The Social Psychology Model
This Article uses the example of the ICTY to demonstrate that
the factors most scholars have identified as driving the perceived
legitimacy of international criminal courts cannot explain how the
people in the former Yugoslavia perceived the ICTY. Then it uses the
latest in social psychology research as well as numerous attitude
surveys to construct a theoretical and empirical explanation for how
the ICTY was perceived. This explanation, called the social
psychology model, does a better job of explaining attitudes toward the
ICTY than the traditional model.
The social psychology model predicts that when an affected
group identifies strongly with one of the sides in a conflict and has a
dominant internal narrative that denies responsibility for the conflict
and any ensuing crimes, then indicting members of that group will
cause the group to view the court negatively. This negative perception
will be the result of various motivational and cognitive biases acting
together, including motivated reasoning, use of heuristics, cognitive
dissonance, and confirmation bias. Further, the effect of these biases,
when they are present, will outweigh the effect of political events or
any of the factors identified in the traditional model of perceived
legitimacy.

III. USING THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY MODEL TO EXPLAIN THE
PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF OTHER COURTS

Next, the social psychology model will be applied to several other
courts, including the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and the

173.
See supra Part II.B.2.a, II.B.2.c (discussing how studies of heuristics and
confirmation bias suggest that institutional structure and outreach programs have
little effect on a population's perception of international criminal courts).
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Regulation 64 Panels in Kosovo, to see if it can explain how the
affected populations in these countries perceive their respective
courts.
A. The SCSL
It is possible to see the effect of the social psychology model in
the way that Sierra Leoneans perceive the Special Court of Sierra
Leone. One of the armed groups that participated in the conflict in
Sierra Leone was called the Civil Defense Forces (CDF). The CDF
supported the government of Sierra Leone against the two primary
rebel groups, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). 174 The CDF was particularly
strong in the south and east of Sierra Leone, where it was comprised
largely of the Kamajors. 175 The Kamajors were commanded by Chief
Samuel Hinga Norman, 176 and came almost exclusively from the
Mende ethnic group. 177 While the Kamajors succeeded in keeping the
RUF out of southern and eastern Sierra Leone, they also engaged in
widespread human rights violations,'178 many of which were directed
against non-Mende groups-particularly those from northern Sierra
179
Leone.
Samuel Hinga Norman was popular in southern and eastern
Sierra Leone because of the success of his forces against the RUF,
and there is anecdotal evidence that his indictment by the Special

174.

SIERRA LEONE TRUTH

&

RECONCILIATION COMM'N, 2 WITNESS TO TRUTH:

REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 76-77 (2004),
available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/TRCDocuments.html. There was also evidence
of some conflict between the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the CDF. Id. at 67-68, 77.
175.
Id. at 9-10, 76-77, 79. The Kamajors are a Mende-based rural militia from
the south and east of Sierra Leone. They were initially composed of traditional hunters
with crude homemade weapons, but obtained more sophisticated weapons in the 1990s.
Steve Riley, Sierra Leone: The Militariat Strikes Again, 24 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 287,
288 (1997).
176.
SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 174, at 67;
see TOM PERRIELLO & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE UNDER SCRUTINY 6, 8 (2006), available at
http://ictj.org/sites/default/filesICTJ-SierraLeone-Special-Court-2006-English.pdf
(stating that Chief Samuel Hinga Norman led the CDF).
177.
SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 174, at 77.
The Mende are an ethnic group that make up about 30 percent of the population of
Sierra Leone and are found primarily in the south of the country. PERRIELLO &
WEIRDA, supra note 176, at 5. Historically there have been tensions between the
Mende and another large ethnic group called the Temne, who also comprise about 30
percent of the population and are found largely in the north of the country. Id. This
ethnic tension between Mende and Temne was likely one of the causes of the conflict in
Sierra Leone. Id. at 4.
178.
SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 174, at 76.
179.
Id. at 28, 77, 79.
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Court for violations of international criminal law was unpopular
among his supporters.18 0 Applying the social psychology model, one
would predict that Norman's indictment would cause those who had
supported him and who identified with him (i.e., those who would
treat his indictment as an attack on themselves and their group) to
view the Special Court more negatively. Support for Norman appears
to have been largely concentrated in the south and east of the
81
country, particularly among members of the Mende ethnic group.'
Thus, one would predict that perceptions of the court following
Norman's indictment would be more negative in the south and east of
Sierra Leone than in the rest of Sierra Leone, and that the perception
of the court would be particularly negative among the Mende.
Although there have been only two credible surveys of Sierra Leonean
attitudes toward the SCSL, they indicate that it is perceived more
negatively in the south and east of the country.18 2 Further, although
only one survey addresses this point, the perception of the court is
i8 3
even more negative among Mende respondents.
Consistent with what one would expect, 8 4 virtually all Sierra
Leoneans have an opinion about the Special Court, even though only
a very small percentage of the population has a meaningful
understanding of what the court does.' 8 5 In one survey, 51 percent of

180.
See PERRIELLO & WEIRDA, supra note 176, at 38 (describing the
"aggressive" criticism of the Special Court leveled by those believing Norman was
"wrongfully indicted"); Arzt, supra note 50, at 234 (noting the belief held by many that
Norman was inappropriately arrested); Edward Sawyer & Tim Kelsall, Truth us.
Justice? Popular Views on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, 7 ONLINE J. PEACE & CONFLICT RESOL. 36, 59 (2007) (quoting
Sierra Leoneans who supported Norman); Chandra Lekha Sriram, Wrong-Sizing
International Justice? The Hybrid Tribunal in Sierra Leone, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
472, 489, 494-95 (2006) (noting that Samuel Hinga Norman was "viewed by many as a
national hero," particularly among former members of the CDF); Rachel Kerr & Jessica
Lincoln, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Outreach, Legacy and Impact 22 (Feb.
2008)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.kcl.ac.ukl
content/1/c6/04/95/60/SCSLOutreach LegacyandImpactFinalReport.pdf (characterizing
the "decision to indict Hinga-Norman" as "devisive and controversial"). One supporter
said, "Hinga Norman should not be on trial because he brought peace in Sierra
Leone-we are really troubled here about his arrest," and another said, "Hinga
Norman should not be on trial-he fought for our lives." Sawyer & Kelsall, supra, at
59.
181.
See supra text accompanying notes 175-77.
182.
See infra text accompanying notes 190-93.
183.
See infra note 195.
184.
See supra Part II.B.2.a (discussing how people use heuristics to form
opinions about entities which they do not have sufficient information to evaluate
objectively).
185.
Sawyer and Kelsall found that although 91 percent of the people they
interviewed had heard of the SCSL, only 15 percent of those respondents that said they
had heard of the SCSL had a "good" understanding of the organization. Sawyer &
Kelsall, supra note 180, at 41, 44. People were deemed to have a "good" understanding
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the respondents described the SCSL as either quite successful (32
percent) or very successful (19 percent).1 8 6 This slightly outweighed
the 49 percent of respondents who said the SCSL was either not
successful or who did not know whether the SCSL had been a
success.1 8 7 Another survey found that 68 percent of respondents rated
the SCSL's performance as either excellent or good, while the
remaining 32 percent viewed the court's work as fair, poor, or neither
good nor bad.18 8 These results seem somewhat inconsistent, but there
have been few surveys of attitudes toward the court by Sierra
Leoneans, 8 9 so there is no easy way to reconcile the findings.
Probably the best that can be said is that a majority of Sierra
Leoneans appear to support the court, but it is unclear how large that
majority is.
Nevertheless, if one looks at the regional variations in attitudes
toward the court, there are identifiable differences that are consistent
with the predictions made by the social psychology model. In one
study conducted by Edward Sawyer and Tim Kelsall, the authors
chose to administer their survey in Kenema District in the south of
Sierra Leone because it had been a center of support for the CDF. 190
They wished to explore whether the indictment of Samuel Hinga

of the court if they knew that it was created to prosecute those who bore the most
responsibility for the war. Id. at 44. The vast majority of respondents had little or no
understanding of what the court does. Id. A different survey conducted by the BBC
World Service Trust found that 98 percent of men and 94 percent of women in Sierra
Leone had heard of the SCSL. BBC WORLD SERV. TRUST, PEACE, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION IN SIERRA LEONE: A SURVEY OF KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS
TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN POST-CONFLICT SIERRA LEONE 59 (2008). Only 7
percent of their respondents indicated that they knew "a lot" about the SCSL, but 86
percent offered an opinion about whether the Special Court had performed well or not.
Id. at 60, 65.
See Sawyer & Kelsall, supra note 180, at 46-47.
186.
Id.
187.
BBC WORLD SERV. TRUST, supra note 185, at 65.
188.
There is a third survey that was commissioned by the court. See
189.
MEMUNATU BABY PRATT, SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE, NATIONWIDE SURVEY REPORT
OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (2007) [hereinafter
SCSL NATIONWIDE SURVEY REPORT]. However, that survey has been criticized for its
methodology and impartiality. Kerr & Lincoln, supra note 180, at 13. Some of its
results also seem anomalous. For example, the court's survey found that 88 percent of
people surveyed thought the outreach teams of the Special Court were doing a "great
job." SCSL NATIONWIDE SURVEY REPORT, supra, at 32. It seems unlikely that 88
percent of respondents would even know about the outreach teams, let alone know.
enough about them to evaluate their effectiveness. See supra Part II.B.2.a (noting that
few people know enough about courts to seriously evaluate their work). For these
reasons, the court-commissioned survey has largely been discounted in this analysis.
See Sawyer & Kelsall, supra note 180, at 40 (explaining that "[t]he
190.
locations were chosen to allow for a relatively even national geography in the sample,"
that different regions of the country had varying experiences of the conflict, and that
Kenema became a center for CDF resistance).
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Norman had affected attitudes toward the SCSL in Kenema
District. 191 What they found was that the percentage of people who
viewed the SCSL as very successful was lower in Kenema District
than anywhere else they studied (13 percent versus 19 percent for the
study as a whole). 19 2 A similar effect was found in a study conducted
by the BBC World Service Trust. While 15 percent of respondents
nationwide said that the SCSL had done an "excellent" job, the rate
was only 8 percent in Kenema District, and 0 percent in neighboring
Kailahun District. 19 3 These surveys show that support for the SCSL
is significantly lower in southern and eastern Sierra Leone than in
the rest of the country.
Sawyer and Kelsall also asked respondents whether Samuel
Hinga Norman should be on trial at the SCSL. Here again, results
were different in Kenema District. While 28 percent of the
respondents in the country as a whole said that Norman should not
be on trial, 65 percent of the respondents in Kenema District said he
should not be on trial-a rate more than twice as high as in the rest
of the country. 194 The percentage of Mende respondents in Kenema
195
District who opposed Norman's trial was even higher.
A similar effect was found in the survey conducted by the BBC
World Service Trust. That survey found significant geographic
variation in response to the question, "Do you think the right people
are being brought to trial by the Special Court?" While 72 percent of
the respondents nationwide said the court was trying the right people
or mostly the right people, some districts like Bombali District in the
north of the country had percentages as high as 94 percent, while
many southern and eastern districts, like Bo (54 percent), Kenema
196
(65 percent) and Kailahun (38 percent), had much lower figures.

191.
Id.
192.
Id. at 45-47 & n.30.
193.
BBC WORLD SERV. TRUST, supra note 185, at 66-67.
194.
See Sawyer & Kelsall, supra note 180, at 58-59 (reporting, graphically and
numerically, the differing proportions of responses to the inquiry into whether Norman
should not be on trial).
195.
Regrettably, Kelsall and Sawyer do not provide the exact level of Mende
opposition to Norman's trial. They report that non-Mende opposition was only 29
percent, indicating that Mende opposition was higher than 65 percent, but it is
impossible to calculate the exact level of Mende opposition without knowing the ratio of
Mende to non-Mende in the sample from Kenema District. See id. at 59 ("[Although
there was strong opposition to Norman's indictment in Kenema (65%), this fell to only
29% from the non-Mende respondents in the region.").
196.
BBC WORLD SERV. TRUST, supra note 185, at 67-68. These results are
consistent with opposition to the trials of CDF leaders in districts that were CDF
strongholds. These results probably do not directly measure opposition to the trial of
Samuel Hinga Norman because he died in February 2007, while the BBC World
Service Trust survey was not administered until June 2007. Id. at 7; Sawyer & Kelsall,
supranote 180, at 63 & n.104.
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Kelsall and Sawyer found that, at least with respect to their study,
these geographic variations were not the result of random chance, but
represent statistically significant differences in the way the SCSL is
197
perceived in Kenema District compared to the rest of Sierra Leone.
In short, perceptions of the SCSL are substantially more negative in
Kenema District than in the rest of Sierra Leone, while opposition to
the indictment and trial of Samuel Hinga Norman was significantly
higher. 198 The opinions of respondents from the Mende ethnic
group-the group most associated with the CDF and with Normanwere even more negative than the results for Kenema District as a
whole. 199 These results are consistent with the outcomes predicted by
the social psychology model. In other words, the indictment of Samuel
Hinga Norman appears to have had a significantly and measurably
negative effect on perceptions of the SCSL in Sierra Leone,
particularly in areas and among groups that supported him.
The same does not appear to be the case with the indictments of
senior members of the RUF and AFRC, but this is not necessarily
inconsistent with the social psychology model because one would not
expect the trials of RUF or AFRC leaders to generate the same
negative perceptions of the court as the trial of Samuel Hinga
Norman. 20 0 For the social psychology model to operate, a group has to
identify with one or more of the accused. If no group identifies with
the accused, then charges against the accused are much less likely to
produce an affective response within the affected population and are
20 1
correspondingly less likely to lower perceptions of legitimacy.
In other words, if few people in Sierra Leone identified with
either the RUF or AFRC, then one would not expect to see a large
negative impact on perceptions of the SCSL caused by the
indictments. And indeed, the evidence indicates that neither the RUF
nor the AFRC had much support within Sierra Leone, largely because

197.
Cf. Sawyer & Kelsall, supra note 180, at 51. Statistical significance was
established with greater than a 95 percent confidence level. Id. at 50.
198.
Norman died in custody in February 2007. Id. at 63 n.104. Anecdotal
reports suggest that Norman's supporters in the South and East blamed the court for
his death. Kerr & Lincoln, supranote 180, at 22.
199.
See supra note 195.
200.
On a related note, one would expect that prosecution of AFRC and RUF
leaders would be viewed positively among supporters of the CDF. And this appears to
be true, as support for the prosecution of AFRC and RUF leaders was highest in
Kenema District, a stronghold of the CDF, even as overall support for the court in
Kenema District was the lowest in the country. See Sawyer & Kelsall, supra note 180,
at, 60 (reporting that feelings that Sessay should be on trial were "strongest in rural
Kenema" and that support for Brima's trial was "greatest in the Kenema sample");
supra text accompanying notes 192-93.
201.
See supra notes 120-23.
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of their horrific treatment of civilians during the conflict. 20 2 Nor were
the RUF or AFRC clearly associated with a particular ethnic,
religious, or national group in the same way that the CDF was
associated with the Mende. 20 3 Thus, one would not anticipate that a
large affected population would strongly identify with the RUF or the
AFRC. Consequently, one would predict that prosecuting RUF or
AFRC leaders would not have as large of a negative effect on
perceptions of the court as did the prosecution of Norman. The
limited survey data that is available is consistent with this
hypothesis.
Kelsall and Sawyer found that support for the prosecution of Issa
Sessay, the most senior RUF indictee, was higher nationwide than for
any other accused before the court. 20 4 This is consistent with the
20 5
RUF's lack of a large constituency among Sierra Leoneans.
Support for the prosecution of Sessay was lowest in Tonkolili District,
a northern district that had been controlled by Sessay and was
reportedly sympathetic to him.20 6 However, even in Tonkolili District,
only 1 percent of respondents said Sessay should not be on trial,
compared to 65 percent of respondents in Kenema District who said

202.
PERRIELLO & WEIRDA, supra note 176, at 6-9. The RUF engaged in
widespread and systematic human rights violations against civilians. Physicians for
Human Rights estimated that more than half the women who came into contact with
RUF forces suffered some form of sexual violence. Id. at 8. The RUF and the AFRC
were also notorious for intentionally amputating the hands and feet of civilians and
engaged in the widespread destruction of property. Id. at 9. As a result, both groups
were deeply unpopular with the majority of Sierra Leoneans. Id. at 6; see also SIERRA
LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 174, at 42-45, 59-62 (detailing
the human rights violations attributed to the RUF and AFRC and the public's negative
reactions to these organizations). According to the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, the RUF and the AFRC were also responsible for the largest number of
violations reported to the Commission, with 60.5 percent of the violations attributed to
the RUF and 9.8 percent to the AFRC, versus only 6 percent attributed to the CDF. Id.
at 38. The RUF was even unpopular among its former combatants, many of whom had
been forcibly recruited by their commanders and felt betrayed by the RUF. See Sriram,
supra note 180, at 495. This apparently translated into "relatively strong support" for
the SCSL among former RUF combatants. Id.
203.
See supra note 177 (discussing the affiliation between the CDF and the
Mende).
204.
See Sawyer & Kelsall, supra note 180, at 40, 60.
205.
See generally Ibrahim Abdullah, Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and
Characterof the Revolutionary United Front/SierraLeone, 36 J. MOD. AFR.STUD. 203,
224 (1998). "Instead of implementing a revolutionary programme, [the RUF] embarked
on a campaign of terror in the countryside. This aspect of the RUF explains why the
peasantry, the natural ally of most revolutionary movements in the so-called Third
World, deserted the movement." Id. at 224; see also supra note 202 for a recounting of
the RUF's human rights violations.
206.
See Sawyer & Kelsall, supra note 180, at 40, 60 n.97 (explaining that
Tonkolili District was controlled by the RUF and Sessay and that Tonkolili District
"had a reputation of being sympathetic towards the rebels").
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that Norman should not be on trial. 20 7 Thus, opposition to the
prosecution of RUF leaders in pro-RUF areas was dramatically lower
than opposition to the prosecution of CDF leaders in pro-CDF
areas.20 8 This is consistent with the hypothesis that the RUF had a
relatively small following and that therefore prosecution of RUF
leaders would not produce widespread negative perceptions of the
court. Indeed, prosecution of RUF leaders does not seem to have
significantly affected perceptions of the SCSL, even in reportedly pro20 9
RUF areas.
In short, the survey evidence from Sierra Leone is consistent
with the social psychology model, which predicts that whom the court
indicts can have a large negative effect on how the court is perceived
by affected groups that identify with one of the "sides" in the conflict.
However, the survey data is not perfect. There is an obvious
limitation in the data, but that limitation is likely to underestimate
the effect of the social psychology model on perceptions of the court.
None of the surveys asked the respondents about which side in the
conflict (if any) they identified with. Kelsall and Sawyer attempted to
21
get at this information by looking at ethnicity in Kenema District,
with the assumption that people from the Mende group would be
more supportive of the CDF and Samuel Hinga Norman than nonMende, but both the studies focus primarily on geographic
differences. 211 This is a significant limitation because it is clear that
even within areas that are thought of as strongholds of one group or
another, there are significant numbers of people who do not identify
with that group. 212 Thus, focusing on geographic regions and using
them as a proxy for support for a side in the conflict most likely
underestimates the extent to which indictments have caused negative
perceptions of the court among groups that sided with one of the
participants in the conflict. A survey that explicitly collected
information on the side in the conflict that respondents identified

207.
Id. at 59-60. At the same time, only 29 percent of respondents in Kenema
District thought Norman should be on trial, whereas 59 percent of respondents in
Tonkolili District thought that Sessay should be on trial. Id.
208.
Unsurprisingly, support for the prosecution of Norman was highest in
Tonkolili District-probably the result of anti-CDF feelings in areas that had been
controlled by the RUF. Id. at 58.
209.
Unfortunately, Kelsall and Sawyer do not provide specific results for the
percentage of respondents in Tonkolili District that thought the court had been "very
successful." However, it must not have differed significantly from the overall figures
because they called particular attention to Kenema District when its results were
different from the nationwide results. Id. at 45 & n.30.
210.
See supra note 195.
211.
See supra notes 194-95, 197.
212.
For example, Kelsall and Sawyer identified significant differences in the
responses of Mende and non-Mende respondents in Kenema District. See supra note
195.
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with (if such a survey was possible) would probably reveal much more
negative perceptions of the SCSL among Sierra Leoneans that
identify with the CDF, RUF, or AFRC.
B. The ECCC
The social psychology model does not predict that Cambodians
will have negative perceptions of the ECCC. To begin with, the ECCC
is only prosecuting the former Khmer Rouge, and the Khmer Rouge
have very little constituency-in fact they are overwhelmingly reviled
by the populace. 2 13 Thus there is no large group of Cambodians who
are predisposed to view the ECCC negatively because of its
prosecution of former Khmer Rouge leaders. 214 In this sense, the
ECCC's prosecution of former Khmer Rouge cadres looks a little like
would not expect
the SCSL's prosecution of the RUF and AFRC-one
215
court.
the
of
perceptions
negative
it to produce
However, the biases described in Part II do impact perceptions of
the ECCC. The dominant internal narrative among Cambodians
about responsibility for the period of Democratic Kampuchea is, "the
Khmer Rouge were responsible. '216 Thus, to the extent that the
ECCC is perceived as "punishing" the Khmer Rouge by prosecuting
their former leaders and assigning them blame for what happened
during the period of Democratic Kampuchea, one would expect that
the majority of the population would be motivated to view the court
favorably. And indeed, that is the case.
In one recent survey of Cambodian attitudes toward the ECCC,
of
more than half of the respondents reported having some knowledge 217
the ECCC, although detailed knowledge of the ECCC was rare.

Overall, Cambodians have very negative feelings toward the Khmer Rouge.
213.
In one study, 82 percent of Cambodians indicated that they had "feelings of hatred" for
those Khmer Rouge responsible for violence, while only 32 percent of respondents
would feel "comfortable" living in the same community as former Khmer Rouge.
PHUONG PHAM ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY, SO WE WILL
NEVER FORGET: A POPULATION-BASED SURVEY ON ATTITUDES ABOUT SOCIAL
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA 28

fig.4, 29 tbl.5 (2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/HRCweb/pdfs/So-WeWill-Never-Forget.pdf.
See supra notes 120-23 (describing how members of the affected population
214.
must identify with the accused before the charges against the accused will cause
cognitive dissonance and result in negative perceptions of the court).
215.
See supra notes 200-09 and accompanying text.
More than 90 percent of those who lived through the period of Democratic
216.
Kampuchea identified themselves as victims of the Khmer Rouge. PHAM ET AL., supra
note 213, at 24. In addition, more than 90 percent of respondents indicated that it was
important to hold Khmer Rouge responsible for what happened during the period of
Democratic Kampuchea. Id. at 31 tbl.7.
Id. at 36. Forty-six percent of respondents reported having "a little"
217.
knowledge about the ECCC, while 15 percent reported having "moderate" knowledge.
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Those who indicated that they knew something about the ECCC were
overwhelmingly supportive of the tribunal. Eighty-seven percent said
the ECCC would respond to the crimes committed by the Khmer
Rouge, while 67 percent believe the judges would be fair and the court
would be neutral. 218 Sixty-eight percent felt that the ECCC would
have a positive effect on the victims of the Khmer Rouge and their
families.2 19 Even a significant number of those who said they had
little or no knowledge of the court nonetheless said that the ECCC
would bring justice and punish the guilty. 220 Thus, perceptions of the
legitimacy of the ECCC among the affected population are largely
positive.
Most Cambodians are probably motivated to perceive the ECCC
positively because they believe it will punish those whom they believe
are responsible for the crimes committed against them and their
families. Thus, one would expect confirmation bias to reinforce and
preserve this positive perception, even in the face of evidence that
should undermine positive perceptions of its legitimacy. 221 And
indeed, the positive perception of the ECCC's legitimacy appears to
exist despite some fairly serious concerns about the court's fairness
and independence--concerns that procedural justice theory predicts
222
should undermine a court's legitimacy.
A majority of the ECCC's judges and the Cambodian CoProsecutor were appointed by the Cambodian government and come
from the Cambodian judiciary. 223 This is potentially problematic
because the Cambodian judiciary is corrupt 224 and subject to regular

Thirty-nine percent reported having no knowledge. Id. However, there may be
difficulties taking self-reported knowledge at face value, as only 10 percent of
respondents knew how many individuals had been charged, and only 3 percent could
actually name those individuals. Id. at 37.
218.
Id. at 3-4.
219.
Id. at 3.
220.
Id. at 4.
221.
See supra Part II.B.2.c.
222.
Procedural justice theory predicts that the fairness and independence of the
process should drive perceptions of a court's legitimacy, not the outcome. However, this
does not seem to be the case for international criminal courts. For such courts,
outcomes seem to drive perceptions of legitimacy. See infra Part III.D (discussing
procedural justice theory and its applicability to international criminal courts).
223.
See Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea, Law No. NSfRKM11004/006, arts. 9, 16, 20, 23 (Oct. 27, 2004) (Cambodia)
[hereinafter
Cambodian
ECCC
Law],
unofficial translation available at
http://www.derechos.org/human-rights/seasia/doc/krlaw.html (stating that the ECCC
Trial Chamber shall include Cambodian judges and that one of the Co-Prosecutors
shall be Cambodian).
224.
See OPEN SOC'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, POLITICAL INTERFERENCE AT THE
EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA 4-5 (2010), available at

http://www.soros.org/initiatives/ ustice/focus/international justice/articles-publications/
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political interference. 225 As one report described the situation, "Power
and patronage are the keys to success in Cambodian political life. The
government does not permit court-administered justice to impose any
226
restrictions or control over those who have power and influence.
In a recent survey, only 36 percent of Cambodians said they trusted
the Cambodian judiciary and only 37 percent said they trusted
Cambodian judges. 227 There was a concern that this would spill over
into the ECCC and that the Cambodian government would seek to
influence the decisions of the Cambodian judges. As a result, various
measures were built into the ECCC structure in an attempt to limit
228
interference by the Cambodian government.
Despite these measures, there is fairly strong evidence that there
has been political interference in the court. In December 2008, the
International Co-Prosecutor sought to open investigations against
additional suspects, despite vocal opposition by members of the
government, including Prime Minister Hun Sen. The Cambodian CoProsecutor refused to participate in the matter, even though she did
not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence against the additional
suspects. The matter eventually went before the Pre-Trial Chamber
where all of the Cambodian judges voted against permitting the new
investigation. The matter then moved to the Office of the CoInvestigating Judges, where the Cambodian Co-Investigating Judge
refused to authorize any investigative acts. 229 Subsequently, the
International Co-Investigating Judge resigned, complaining about the
in
the
interference"
"attempted
government's
Cambodian

publications/political-interference-report-20100706) (discussing a "permissive culture of
bribery by parties wishing to influence judicial outcomes"). In a recent survey, more
than 60 percent of respondents said that going to court meant paying bribes to judges.
PHAM ET AL., supra note 213, at 33.
225.
Cambodian judges are hired and promoted at the discretion of the
executive. Moreover, there is an extensive patronage system among members of the
judiciary in which judges must be obedient to the wishes of the ruling elite in order to
keep their jobs. OPEN SOC'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 224, at 5.
226.
See ATLAS PROJECT, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN CAMBODIA: ANALYTICAL
REPORT 18 (Alex Bates ed., 2010), available at http://projetatlas.univ-parisl.fr/
spip.php?rubrique27; PHAM ET AL., supra note 213, at 15-16 (discussing how "the
judiciary system has been criticized for its lack of independence, incompetence, and
corruption").
227.
See PHAM ET AL., supra note 213, at 33.
See OPEN SOC'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 224, at 10-16 (discussing
228.
protections to prevent or remedy political interference).
See ATLAS PROJECT, supra note 226, at 52-53 (discussing how the
229.
Cambodian Co-Investigating Judge withdrew his signature for such investigations,
"thereby reinforcing claims that the national judicial staff were being given
instructions by the Cambodian government"); OPEN SOC'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra
note 224, at 16-22 (noting how some Cambodian officials refused to participate in
judicial investigations).
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investigations. 230 Shortly thereafter, a decision by the Pre-Trial
Chamber over access to the case file resulted in a split decision in
which all of the Cambodian judges refused to grant victims access to
the file and the international judges wrote a separate opinion that
cataloged a series of dubious decisions by the Co-Investigating Judges
that seem to have been designed to prevent scrutiny of their decision
23 1
not to investigate the additional suspects.
A second instance of what appears to be political interference
occurred in the context of the International Co-Investigating Judge's
attempts to interview high-ranking members of the current
government. The Cambodian Co-Investigating Judge refused to sign
the summons that would compel the appearance of the government
officials. The government stated that members of the government
should not comply with the summons, and indeed, Cambodian
government officials refused to comply. 232 When the question of the
summons came before the Pre-Trial Chamber, the judges were once
again split. The international judges described the government's
actions as political interference and the national judges offered weak
and largely irrelevant justifications for the failure of the witnesses to
233
appear.
While there is no "smoking gun," there is substantial
circumstantial evidence of political interference by the Cambodian
government in the decision making of Cambodian judges at the

230.
See Statement by the InternationalCo-InvestigatingJudge, EXTRAORDINARY
CHAMBERS COURTS CAMBODIA (Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/
statement-international-co-investigating-judge ("Because of these repeated statements,
which will be perceived as attempted interference by Government officials... the
International Co-Investigating Judge has submitted his resignation to the Secretary.
General as of 9 October 2011."). See generally Cambodia: Judges Investigating Khmer
Rouge
Crimes
Should
Resign,
HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
(Oct.
3,
2011),
http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2011/10/03/cambodia-judges-investigating-khmerrouge-crimes-should-resign (calling on the Co-Investigating Judges to resign after
"politically motivated interference" at the court by the government of Hun Sen).
231.
See Pre-Trial Chamber Decision No. D11/2/4/4, Consideration of the PreTrial Chamber Regarding the Appeal Against Order on the Admissibility of Civil Party
Applicant Robert Hamill (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/document/court/
considerations-pre-trial-chamber-regarding-appeal-against-order-admissibility-civil-p
(containing both opinions from the split decision).
232.
At the time, a government spokesperson said that any international
personnel at the ECCC who were unhappy with this position could "pack up their
clothes and go home." ATLAS PROJECT, supra note 226, at 53; see also OPEN SOC'Y
JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 224, at 22-23 (noting that "none of the individuals
agreed to appear as requested").
233.
See ATLAS PROJECT, supranote 226, at 53-58 (explaining how the Pre-Trial
Chamber was divided between national and international judges); OPEN SOCY JUSTICE
INITIATIVE, supranote 224, at 22-23.
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ECCC. 23 4 In a rational world, one would expect doubts about a court's
fairness and independence to undermine belief in its legitimacy. Yet
the ECCC is still perceived positively by most Cambodians, and what
we know of confirmation bias suggests that this positive perception
will be largely impervious to additional evidence that the court is not
fair and neutral, so long as the court is seen as assigning blame to the
235
Khmer Rouge.
C. Regulation 64 Panels in Kosovo
There is also evidence that the social psychology model explains
how affected populations perceive domestic criminal courts receiving
236
international assistance, like the Regulation 64 Panels in Kosovo.
The Panels were created because almost all of the newly appointed
members of the judiciary were ethnically Albanian and seemed to be
systematically favoring ethnic Albanians over ethnic Serbs in cases
that came before them. 23 7 The Panels were designed to give
international judges control over particular ethnically charged cases
so as to "ensure the independence and impartiality of the
judiciary. '238 It appears that the Panels largely achieved their

234.
In addition, there is evidence of fairly pervasive corruption as well,
although this may be in the process of being addressed. ATLAS PROJECT, supra note
226, at 58-60.
235.
However, this does not mean that the ECCC cannot be viewed negatively
by Cambodians. If the court were to acquit any of the senior leaders currently on trial,
this would probably lead to negative perceptions of the court. In effect, positive
perceptions of the ECCC's legitimacy are largely dependent on its ability to validate
the dominant internal narrative among Cambodians and assign responsibility for past
atrocities to the Khmer Rouge.
236.
Although the Regulation 64 Panels do try cases involving violations of
international criminal law and involve international judges and prosecutors, they are
not international criminal courts. See Stuart Ford, How Leadership in International
Criminal Law Is Shifting from the U.S. to Europe and Asia: An Analysis of Spending
on and Contributionsto InternationalCriminal Courts, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 953, 99698 (2011) ("[T]he Regulation 64 Panels were not primarily designed to prosecute
international crimes.").
237.
See INT'L CRISIS GRP., BALKANS REPORT No. 134, FINDING THE BALANCE:
THE SCALES OF JUSTICE IN KosovO 5, 20 (2002); TOM PERRIELLO & MARIEKE WIERDA,
INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, LESSONS FROM THE DEPLOYMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN Kosovo 12-14 (2006) (discussing the
establishment of the internationalized UNMIK Regulation 64 panels); Robert F.
Carolan, An Examination of the Role of Hybrid International Tribunals in Prosecuting
War Crimes and Developing Independent Domestic Court Systems: The Kosovo
Experiment, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 15-19 (2008) (describing the
creation of a court system in Kosovo under UNMIK).
238.
U.N. Mission in Kosovo Reg. No. 2000/64, § 1.1, U.N. Doc.
UNMIKIREG/2000/64 (Dec. 15, 2000), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/
regulations/2000/reg64-0O.htm ("At any stage in the criminal proceedings, the
competent prosecutor, the accused or the defence counsel may submit to the
Department of Judicial Affairs a petition for an assignment of international
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goals. 239 However, this did not cause the affected population to
perceive the Panels in a positive manner.
As one would expect, knowledge about the Regulation 64 Panels
was very low in both ethnic groups. 240 At the same time, the
prerequisites to the application of the social psychology modelidentification and a narrative of victimization-were present in both
groups. Albanian Kosovars and Serbian Kosovars both identified
strongly with their respective sides in the conflict, 241 and there was a
widespread belief among both ethnic groups that crimes were
exclusively carried out by members of the other group, 242 even though

this was not true. 24 3 Thus, one would predict that indictments of
Kosovar Albanians would lower perceptions of the Panels' legitimacy
among ethnic Albanians, while indictments of Serbian Kosovars
would lower perceptions of the Panels' legitimacy among ethnic
Serbs. Indeed, this is what happened. 244 Ethnic Serbians largely

judges/prosecutors and/or a change of venue where this is considered necessary to
ensure the independence and impartiality of the judiciary or the proper administration
of justice.").
239.
See INT'L CRISIS GRP., supra note 237, at 20 (noting that the "use of
international judges and prosecutors has eliminated bias and helped curtail the
injustices that took place in the first trials" including by retrying earlier cases, which
resulted in a number of acquittals and reduction in charges).
240.
Fifty percent of respondents in one survey said they were "not informed"
about the work of the Regulation 64 Panels, around 30 percent said they had some
information, and only 4 percent said they were "well informed." U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME,
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: REPORT ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
OPINION POLLING SURVEY CONDUCTED IN APRIL-MAY 2007 IN KosOvo 17 fig.9 (2007),
available at http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/transitionaljusticeeng.pdf.
On the whole, Kosovar Albanians indicated that they were better informed than
Serbian Kosovars, but overall knowledge levels were still very low. Id.
241.
See INT'L CRISIS GRP., supra note 237, at 5, 21 (noting that the arrest of
former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) resulted in street protests and
attacks on the Panels by Albanian Kosovar politicians); PERRIELLO & WIERDA, supra
note 237, at 4-5 (describing the long history of ethnic tension between Albanian
Kosovars and Serb Kosovars).
242.
See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 240, at 17 fig.7 (noting
that more than 80 percent of Albanian Kosovars denied that members of their ethnic
group had committed crimes). Acceptance of the commission of crimes was higher
among the Serbian Kosovar community, but significantly less than 40 percent of
Serbian Kosovars believe that crimes were committed by their ethnic group. Id.; see
also Klarin, supra note 38, at 93 (noting that only 14 percent of ethnic Serbs believed
that Albanian Kosovars were the victims of crimes in the run-up to the NATO bombing
of Serbia).
243.
See PERRIELLO, & WIERDA, supra note 237, at 5-6 (discussing how crimes
were committed by both Albanian and Serbian forces).
244.
See, e.g., INT'L CRISIS GRP., supra note 237, at 5, 21 (quoting a spokesperson
for the Kosovo Protection Corps as saying: "It is very harmful and unacceptable, this
tendency to draw parallels between the just war carried out by the KLA, and crimes
carried out by Serb criminals ....Those who committed crimes against the Albanian
people in Kosovo should be sought only in the Serb side"); PERRIELLO & WIERDA, supra
note 237, at 20, 31 (noting a widespread belief among Albanian Kosovars that ethnic
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viewed the Regulation 64 Panels as unsatisfactory, 245 and Albanian
Kosovars were only slightly less negative about them. 246 It seems
unlikely that outreach or public education efforts could have
compensated for these effects.

24 7

D. PossibleProblems with the Social Psychology Model
This section deals with two concerns that raise questions about
the validity of this Article's conclusions: (1) the overwhelmingly
Western bias of much psychology research and (2) the results of
studies focusing on "procedural justice." The cross-cultural
applicability of social psychology research will be addressed first.
This Article relies heavily on psychology research; however, it is
well known that the vast majority of psychological research takes
place on U.S. subjects, with most of the rest focusing on Western
European subjects. 248 This has potentially significant implications
because some psychological concepts may not apply crossculturally, 249 and the majority of serious violations of international
criminal law in the recent past have taken place in non-Western
countries. 250 As a result, one can question whether psychological

Serbs had been protected by the Panels and that Albanians had been unfairly
persecuted by them).
245.
See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 240, at 15 fig.3 (finding
that only 25 percent of Kosovar Serbians were either "[s]omewhat satisfied" or "[viery
satisfied" with the work of the Panels). Although no specific figure is given, it appears
from Figure 3 that the percentage of Serbians that were "[viery satisfied" with the
Panels was only 1-2 percent. In contrast, the number of Serbians who were "[niot
satisfied" with the Panels' work was about 55 percent. Id. Kosovar Serbians were much
more satisfied with the work of the Belgrade District Court. More than 70 percent of
Serbians indicated they were either "[s]atisfied to some extent" or "[viery satisfied"
with its work. Id. at 15 fig.4.
See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 240, at 15 fig.3 (noting
246.
that 50 percent of Albanian Kosovars were either "[s]omewhat satisfied" or "[v]ery
satisfied" with the work of the Panels). However, even for Albanian Kosovars, the
percentage of people that were "[v]ery satisfied" with the work of the Panels was
around 5 percent. Id. In contrast, Albanian Kosovars had much more negative views of
the Belgrade District Court. Id. at 15 fig.4.
247.
See supra Part II.B.2.c (discussing the effects of confirmation bias and how
it can make it very hard to change perceptions of a court). But see Ramji-Nogales,
supra note 1, at 36 (suggesting that "UNMIK could have performed more substantial
outreach to the local populations").
See Steven J. Heine, Cultural Psychology, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
248.
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 86, at 1423, 1425 (noting that by one recent estimate 94
percent of the subjects in social psychology experiments came from Western countries).
249.
Id.
250.
For example, the International Criminal Court's current caseload includes
investigations and prosecutions in Libya, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the Central African Republic, Sudan, C6te dIvoire, and Kenya. Situations and
Cases, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.intfMenus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases (last
visited Mar. 1, 2012).
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models developed largely by experimenting on Westerners have
validity for the affected populations that international criminal courts
are likely to encounter.
There are theoretical reasons to believe that cognitive dissonance
is cross-cultural, 251 but there is less research on the applicability of
confirmation bias in other cultures.2 52 In a general sense, it appears
that members of collectivist cultures (e.g., some East Asian cultures)
may not respond to threats to self-identity as strongly as members of
individualist cultures (e.g., the United States), but members of
collectivist cultures are still likely to respond to attacks on group
identities. 253 Since the mechanisms proposed in this Article involve
attacks on both individual and group identities, there is reason to
believe they will affect both individualist and collectivist cultures.
And, as a practical matter, the social psychology model offers a
compelling explanation of how the affected populations of the ICTY,
SCSL, ECCC, and Regulation 64 Panels have perceived their
respective tribunals. The theory appears to explain perceived
legitimacy in West Africa and Southeast Asia, which suggests that it
is not limited to Western Europe and North America.
This Article will now address procedural justice theory. There
has been considerable psychological research in recent decades into
what legitimacy is and what it does. 254 More importantly, there has

251.
In one recent study, researchers demonstrated that monkeys exhibit
cognitive dissonance, which suggests that it is a basic cognitive process that probably
exists in all primates, including all humans. See Egan, supra note 105, at 982
(suggesting that cognitive dissonance may be a core cognitive process that exists in all
primates). On the other hand, to the extent that dissonance is the result of cognitions
that conflict with one's self-concept, individuals from cultures that have a more flexible
and interdependent self-concept may experience less dissonance than the average
American, although they may experience more dissonance in other contexts. Heine,
supra note 248, at 1429-31. The motivation to conform is strongly cross-cultural,
although it appears to be weaker in cultures that have an independent self-concept. Id.
at 1440. Similarly, the desire to view oneself positively and to undertake self-protective
responses when confronted with threats to self-esteem appears to be present in most
cultures, although the strength of the motivation is strongest in cultures that have a
disposition toward independent self-concepts. Id. at 1437. However, Heine notes that
studies of East Asian populations have failed to produce evidence of self-serving
motivations. Id.
See Heine, supra note 248, at 1430. One intriguing article suggests that
252.
Chinese subjects may not exhibit attitude polarization, an effect of confirmation bias,
and may be much more willing to tolerate contradictions in general than Western
subjects. Kaiping Peng & Richard E. Nisbett, Culture, Dialectics,and Reasoning About
Contradiction,54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 741, 741 (1999).
253.
See Sherman & Cohen, supra note 67, at 214-15 (discussing how people
tend to be defensive and group-serving when explaining the success or failure of their
group).
254.
See generally Tyler, supra note 2 (providing an overview of psychological
research relating to legitimacy).
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255
also been considerable work done to explain how legitimacy forms.
Professor Tom Tyler and others have shown that "authorities and
institutions are viewed as more legitimate and, therefore, their
decisions and rules are more willingly accepted when they exercise
their authority through procedures that people experience as being
fair. '256 This "fair process effect" is central to procedural justice
theory and has been replicated repeatedly, 257 including in the context
258
of legal decision making.
The existence of the fair process effect is potentially problematic
because it suggests that the perception of international criminal
courts should depend more on whether people perceive the process as
fair than on the actual outcomes of the court proceedings. 259 Yet, it is
hard to explain Bosniak and Serb attitudes toward the ICTY as a
function of the fairness of the process. All the trials at the ICTY were
conducted according to essentially the same procedural rules. Thus,
procedural justice theory suggests that people in the former
Yugoslavia should have viewed the legitimacy of the ICTY roughly
the same across ethnic groups, but this is not what happened.
Bosniaks viewed the court as largely trustworthy and successful,
while Serbians almost universally distrusted it. 260 The best predictor
of attitudes toward the ICTY is the outcome of the ICTY's process
(i.e., whom it indicted and whom it convicted), not the process itself.
Still, we know that the fair process effect exists. So why does it
not drive perceptions of the ICTY's legitimacy? There are several
possibilities. First, it is possible that actual experience with the
institution's procedures is required before the fair process effect

Id. at 379 (providing citations to literature explaining how authorities come
255.
to be seen as legitimate).
Id.
256.
257.
See, e.g., Jason A. Colquitt et al., Justice at the Millennium: A MetaAnalytic Review of 25 Years of Organizational Justice Research, 86 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 425, 435 (2001) (noting that in their meta-analysis, once the authors
controlled for distributive justice, procedural justice continued to have explanatory
power).
See Tom R. Tyler, ProceduralJustice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of
258.
Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 284 (2003) ("[P]eople's reactions to legal authorities are
based to a striking degree on their assessments of the fairness of the processes by
which legal authorities make decisions and treat members of the public.").
Id. at 294-95 (finding that the fairness of the process was much more
259.
important than the outcome in explaining people's satisfaction with the decisions of the
local police and courts).
See supra Part I.A (analyzing the perception of the ICTY among various
260.
groups in the former Yugoslavia). Procedural justice would also have trouble explaining
the legitimacy of the ECCC, which has high levels of perceived legitimacy despite fairly
strong evidence of political interference that the procedural justice literature suggests
should lower evaluations of its fairness and therefore its legitimacy. See supra Part
II.B (evaluating Cambodian attitudes to the ECCC).
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occurs. 261 If true, this would minimize the fair process effect for
international criminal courts because almost nobody within the
affected population is likely to have a good grasp of the court's
procedures or have personal experience with the court.262 A second
possibility is that the post-conflict situations in which many
international criminal trials take place are simply not conducive to
the fair process effect. For example, Professors James Gibson and
Gregory Caldeira have noted that most studies of court legitimacy
have taken place in stable Western democracies. They suggested that
the findings of those studies may not have much applicability in
26 3
deeply divided societies.
A third possibility is that whatever fair process effect might
otherwise exist is overwhelmed by outrage at the court's decisions.
Recent research suggests that when someone has a "moral
mandate,"264 their assessment of whether a procedure is fair is
''predicted nearly exclusively by whether procedures yield an outcome
that threatens or affirms" that mandate. 265 In these circumstances, it
is the outrage at the outcome that determines perceptions of the
fairness of the procedure, not the other way around.26 6 The

261.
For example, Gibson and Caldeira suggest an essential part of the
procedural justice hypothesis is that people have reliable perceptions of the procedures.
"[P]rocedural perceptions that are grounded in the experiences people have with legal
institutions are likely to be influential. Without experience, however, procedural
perceptions may not be of much import." If a person does not have a personal
experience with the legal institution, their perception of fairness is "tapping only
abstract views," which are not good predictors of behavior. James L. Gibson & Gregory
A. Caldeira, Legitimacy of TransnationalLegal Institutions:Compliance, Support, and
the European Court of Justice, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 459, 467 (1995); see also Tom R.
Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and
Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 215, 227 (2001) (finding that fair process effects are strongest among those people
that have had personal experiences with the courts).
262.
See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
263.
See Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 2, at 5-6, 8. Of course, Gibson and
Caldeira were studying the South African Constitutional Court rather than an
international criminal court, but the situations that confront most international
criminal courts are probably more like post-apartheid South Africa than they are like
the United States.
264.
A moral mandate is a strong attitude a person has that they see as rooted
in moral conviction. Elizabeth Mullen & Linda J. Skitka, Exploring the Psychological
Underpinnings of the Moral Mandate Effect: Motivated Reasoning, Group
Differentiation,or Anger?, 90 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 629, 630 (2006).
265.
Id.
266.
Linda J. Skitka, Do the Means Always Justify the Ends, or Do the Ends
Sometimes Justify the Means? A Value Protection Model of Justice Reasoning, 28 PERS.
& SOC. PYSCHOL. BULL. 588, 594 (2002) ("[Elven imagining a threat to a moral
mandate is associated with significant and important effects on perceived procedural
fairness, outcome fairness, and moral outrage."); Linda J. Skitka, Christopher W.
Bauman & Elizabeth Mullen, Morality and Justice: An Expanded Theoretical
Perspective and Empirical Review, in 25 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 21-22 (K.A.
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indictments of ethnic Serbs contradicted the dominant group
narrative and generated outrage in Serbia, and thus one might expect
that the moral mandate effect would overwhelm any fair process
effect. Ultimately, the evidence that perceptions of international
criminal courts can be driven by outcomes is strong, and there are
plausible reasons for the fair process effect being absent among
affected populations. Therefore, the Author does not believe that
procedural justice theory is sufficient reason to reject the social
psychology model.

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY MODEL

Having proposed a new model for understanding the perceived
legitimacy of international criminal courts, this Article will now
explore the implications of that model. This Part first addresses the
following important question: how often will the social psychology
model determine the perception of international criminal courts? If it
only applies rarely, then its implications may be modest. If it applies
in the majority of situations, its implications may be profound.
Second, this Part will explore whether affected populations can
perceive international criminal courts positively, and if not, what this
means for their success as transitional justice mechanisms. The
Article will then propose a constructive role for international criminal
courts in post-conflict reconciliation where negative perceptions of
legitimacy are a both predictable and acceptable result of efforts to
break down self-serving internal narratives within affected groups.
Finally, this Article will explore how courts can succeed in this role.
A. The Social Psychology Model Will Apply in the
Majority of Post-Conflict Situations
The social psychology model predicts that when an affected
group identifies strongly with one of the sides in a conflict and has a
dominant internal narrative that denies responsibility for the conflict
and any ensuing crimes, then indicting members of that group will
cause the group to view the court negatively. 267 Obviously this will
not apply in every situation because it has two prerequisites: strong
identification between a group and a participant in the conflict, plus a
dominant internal narrative within that group that denies

Hedgvedt & J. Clay-Warner eds., 2008) (discussing a study where participants were
enraged by the outcome of cases rather than the moral principle governing the
decision).
267.
For a definition of the social psychology model, see supra Part II.D.
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responsibility. But how often will it apply? Will its application be an
anomaly or will it be the general rule?
In the examples discussed in this Article, all but one of the
situations involved a significant portion of the population identifying
strongly with one of the sides in the conflict. Thus, Bosniaks, Croats,
and Serbs each identified with their respective sides in BosniaHerzegovina, 268 the Mende identified with the CDF in Sierra
Leone, 269 and both Albanian Kosovars and Serbian Kosovars
identified with their respective sides in Kosovo. 270 These are not
anomalies. Whenever a conflict is characterized by sides that break
down along ethnic, religious, or national lines, it is likely that there
will be strong identification between groups within the society and
the participants in the conflict. And it is clear that ethnic, religious,
27 1
and national divisions are at the heart of many modern conflicts.
This suggests that the first prerequisite of the social psychology
272
model will be met in the majority of situations.
The social psychology model's second prerequisite will also be
met in most situations. Most of the groups discussed in this Article
denied responsibility for any violations and blamed other groups for
violations against its own members. Serbs denied responsibility for
violence and blamed Croats and Bosniaks.27 3 Bosniaks denied
responsibility and blamed Serbs and Croats. 274 Similarly, Albanian
Kosovars denied responsibility in Kosovo and blamed Serbian
Kosovars, while Serb Kosovars denied responsibility and blamed
Albanian Kosovars. 275 In Cambodia, most Cambodians blame the
Khmer Rouge for violations and consider themselves victims, 2 76 and
it appears that members of the Mende group in Sierra Leone largely
277
blamed the RUF while denying that the CDF was at fault.

268.
See supra note 35.
269.
See supra notes 194-200.
270.
See supra note 242.
271.
See Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict, 98 AM.
ECON. REV. 2185, 2185 (2008) (noting that "many, if not most" of today's conflicts are
ethnic in nature); David A. Lake & Donald Rothschild, Containing Fear: The Origins
and Management of Ethnic Conflicts, 21 INT'L SECURITY 41, 41 (1996) (noting that the
end of the Cold War unleashed a "wave of ethnic conflict" that swept across Eastern
Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Africa). Ethnicity is not the only source of
conflict. See, e.g., Robert Petit et al., Exploring Critical Issues in Religious Genocide:
Case Studies of Violence in Tibet, Iraq and Gujarat, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 163,
163-64 (2008) (studying several examples of religiously motivated violence).
272.
The example of the RUF and AFRC in Sierra Leone demonstrates that this
will not always be true. See supranotes 200-09.
273.
See supra notes 36-41.
274.
See supra notes 36-38.
275.
See supra note 242.
276.
See supra note 216.
277.
Members of the Mende group had the lowest perceptions of the legitimacy
of the SCSL, the most opposition to the prosecution of Samuel Hinga Norman, and the
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These examples are not anomalies either, because it is human
nature both to deny responsibility and to believe that you are a
victim. People are deeply committed to believing that they are
essentially good. 278 This makes it very difficult for people to accept

that they have committed crimes, as this would be inconsistent with
their self-view. 279 For example, a significant portion of direct
perpetrators of violations of international criminal law consider
themselves victims rather than perpetrators. 28 0 In effect, we deny
28
responsibility for bad acts as a way to preserve our sense of self. '
This has significant effects at the group level. Groups involved in
ethnic conflicts have a strong tendency to see themselves as the
victims of wrongs committed by other groups and to deny
responsibility for crimes committed by members of their own
groups. 28 2 This was clearly the case in the former Yugoslavia-where

highest levels of support for the prosecution of leaders of the RUF. See supra Part III.A.
These facts are consistent with an internal narrative that assigned blame to the RUF
and denied responsibility for crimes carried out by the CDF.
278.
See Aronson, supra note 105, at 131 (arguing that most people strive to
"preserve a morally good sense of self' and that dissonance is produced when people
experience cognitions that induce feelings of guilt); supra note 115.
279.
See Ervin Staub, Reconciliation After Genocide, Mass Killing, or Intractable
Conflict: Understanding the Roots of Violence, Psychological Recovery, and Steps
Toward a General Theory, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 867, 872 (2006) ("The profound changes in
identity, values, views of themselves, and views of the victims ... makes it extremely
difficult for perpetrators of ... mass violence to acknowledge ... that their actions are
wrong.").
280.
The Author has collectively interviewed and read interviews of hundreds of
former Khmer Rouge cadres as part of his work for the ECCC. One striking thing about
former Khmer Rouge cadres is that they often view themselves as being victims. They
may be willing to acknowledge that crimes (executions, torture, beatings, etc.) occurred,
but they are rarely willing to take personal responsibility for them. Regrettably, most
of the statements taken by the ECCC remain confidential, but the Documentation
Center of Cambodia has some statements by former Khmer Rouge cadres on its
website. Searching for the Truth, DOCUMENTATION CENTER CAMBODIA (DC-CAM) (Apr.
12, 2011), http://www.unilu.ch/files/guard-stories.pdf. Several of the statements,
including those of Him Huy and Suos Thy, show a very clear denial of responsibility
that is consistent with what the Author experienced at the ECCC. See also ROY F.
BAUMEISTER, EVIL: INSIDE HUMAN VIOLENCE AND CRUELTY 47-52 (W.H. Freeman &
Co. ed., 1997) ('Many perpetrators regard themselves as victims. In their accounts, in
their recollections, and probably even in their most sincere gut feelings, many
perpetrators see themselves as people who have been unjustly treated and hence
deserve sympathy, support and extra tolerance for any wrongs they may have
committed."); Leigh A. Payne, In Search of Remorse: Confessions by Perpetratorsof Past
State Violence, 11 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 115, 117 (2004) ("[P]erpetrators create 'vital
lies'-euphemisms and stories that diminish their role in violence .... ").
281.
See Gosling et al., supra note 109 (noting how denial of responsibility is
itself a dissonance reduction mechanism).
282.
See Staub, supra note 279, at 872 ("In intractable conflict group beliefs
evolve about the group's just cause and the enemy's responsibility for the conflict and
violence."). See generally Bar-Tal, supra note 120 (discussing self-perceived collective
victimhood in intractable conflicts allegedly imposed by another group). Naive realism
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each group viewed itself as the victim of aggression and crimes
committed by the other groups, even when this did not appear to be
it is not limited to the former
objectively accurate 2 3-but
28 5
284
effect appears to be universal.
this
Rather,
Yugoslavia.
Intergroup conflicts are marked by a "shared narrative" among group
members that "the rival group continuously inflicted unjust and
immoral harm upon them throughout the conflict. '28 6 For this reason,
we would expect the second prerequisite of the social psychology
model to be present in virtually all situations where the first
prerequisite is present. As a result, it is likely that the social
psychology model will be applicable in the majority of post-conflict
situations. This suggests that the implications of the model will be
profound.
B. Perceived Legitimacy as a Negative Sum Game
We can now predict that the social psychology model will apply
in the majority of situations, and that in those situations perceptions
of an international criminal court will be driven largely by whom the
court indicts. But this does not mean that courts will always be
viewed negatively. For example, in Cambodia, there is only one
identifiable group of any size, and it is firmly behind the prosecution
of Khmer Rouge leaders.2 8 7 Thus, there is a good chance that the
court will be viewed positively. 28 8 In Sierra Leone, only one of the
three main participants in the conflict had a significant following,
and thus the court's indictments only generated negative perceptions
among supporters of the CDF. 28 9 The overall result was a court that

probably complicates these issues by making it harder for groups to recognize that
their perceptions of their own actions and those of the other group are affected by
motivated reasoning. See supratext accompanying notes 82-84.
283.
See DAVID BRUCE MACDONALD, BALKAN HOLOCAUSTS? SERBIAN AND
CROATIAN VICTIM CENTRED PROPAGANDA AND THE WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA (Manchester

Univ. Press ed., 2002) (chronicling the mythology of victimization among groups in the
former Yugoslavia); supra notes 36-40.
284.
See Bar-Tal, supra note 122, at 241-42 (noting that a similar dynamic has
occurred in Northern Ireland, Palestine, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka).
285.
Id. at 229-30 ("It is probably universal that in every serious, harsh and
violent intergroup conflict, at least one side-and very often both sides-believe that
they are the victim in that conflict.").
286.
Id. at 230. Once created, this perception of victimization is resistant to
change. Id. at 233.
287.
See supranote 213.
288.
See supra Part III.B (analyzing Cambodian attitudes to the ECCC). Of
course, if the ECCC fails to live up to the expectations of most Cambodians, it still
could end up being viewed negatively. See supra note 235.
289.
See supra Part III.A (evaluating the perception of Sierra Leoneans toward
the Special Court of Sierra Leone).
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was viewed positively, albeit by a relatively small majority of the
290
population.
However, in a situation where virtually the entire affected
population has taken sides in the conflict, the perceived legitimacy of
international criminal courts is likely to be a negative sum game.
Kosovo is the simplest example of this. The conflict in Kosovo was
marked by two sides, and the population was essentially split with
different ethnic groups representing each side.2 91 Indicting Serbian
Kosovars caused negative perceptions among the Serbian Kosovar
population, and indicting Albanian Kosovars caused negative
perceptions among the Albanian Kosovar population. 29 2 Virtually
every decision of the Regulation 64 Panels could be expected to offend
one part of the population and result in a net reduction in perceived
legitimacy. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was more
complicated because there were three participants in the conflict, but
the result was essentially the same.293 Every indictment by the ICTY
caused a net loss of perceived legitimacy because it offended one of
the three groups. The Bosniaks were the only group that did not view
the ICTY negatively, but only because the ICTY largely validated the
Bosniaks' internal narrative of victimhood.
The realization that the perceived legitimacy of international
criminal courts can be a negative sum game has potentially
significant consequences for transitional justice. Many scholars have
argued that positive perceived legitimacy is crucial to the success of
transitional justice mechanisms. 294 But there is a subset of
international criminal courts for which perceived legitimacy is a
negative sum game. 295 It will be virtually impossible for such courts
to be perceived as legitimate because every act they take will lower
their perceived legitimacy. If perceived legitimacy is crucial to
transitional justice, this suggests that international criminal courts
cannot be an effective transitional justice mechanism in situations

290.
See supra notes 185-87.
291.
See supra note 241.
292.
See supra Part III.C (analyzing how affected populations perceive the
Regulation 64 panels in Kosovo).
293.
See supra Part II.A (analyzing the perception of the ICTY among various
groups in the former Yugoslavia).
294.
See supra notes 1-9.
295.
For courts created in response to a particular conflict or having jurisdiction
over a single geographic area, perceived legitimacy will be evaluated for the court as a
whole. Because the ICC is a permanent international criminal court that has
jurisdiction over crimes occurring in multiple separate conflicts and involving multiple
affected populations, the perceived legitimacy of the ICC will have to be evaluated
independently for each situation. Perceived legitimacy may be a negative sum game in
some situations, but not in others.
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where all of the sides are supported by ethnic, religious, or national
296
groups, which appears to be the majority of situations.
But the problem is potentially worse than that. There is reason
to believe that the social psychology model affects the perceived
legitimacy of more than just international criminal courts. Affected
populations that have dominant internal narratives of victimhood
should react negatively to any attempt to attribute responsibility to
their group, whether it comes from an international criminal court or
not. The discussion of Kosovo indicates that domestic courts with
297
international assistance are subject to the social psychology model,
and domestic criminal prosecutions would presumably be affected as
well. Even a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that is simply
tasked with identifying what happened Could face negative
perceptions of legitimacy. 298 Thus, one would expect that under the
right conditions, any transitional justice mechanism could face a
situation where its perceived legitimacy is a negative sum game. Are
these other transitional justice mechanisms also doomed to failure?
This Author believes they are not.
C. The Problem of Self-Serving and Inaccurate
InternalNarratives
The fundamental problem facing international criminal courts
(and other transitional justice mechanisms) is a mismatch between
dominant internal narratives within a group and what actually
happened in the conflict. Most groups are predisposed to see
themselves as victims in the conflict, whether or not this is
historically accurate. 2 99 It is this mismatch between narratives and
reality that causes problems when indictments are issued against
members of the group. At the same time, virtually every group wants
"justice," often in the form of prosecution of those responsible for the
violence. Large majorities of Cambodians, Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs,
and Sierra Leoneans say that they want those responsible put on

296.
Esteban & Ray, supra note 271; see also Lake & Rothschild, supra note 271
(noting the "wave of ethnic conflict" that followed the Cold War); Petit et al., supra note
271 (studying examples of religiously motivated violence).
297.
For a discussion of the Kosovars' negative perception of domestic courts
receiving international assistance, see supra Part III.C.
298.
For example, one would expect that the Sierra Leonean Truth and
Reconciliation Commission's determination that CDF forces were responsible for
"considerable violations and abuses of human rights" would have much the same effect
on perceptions of its legitimacy as Norman's indictment had on perceptions of the
SCSL's legitimacy (at least among supporters of the CDF). SIERRA LEONE TRUTH &
RECONCILIATION COMM'N, supra note 174, at 71; see also id. at 71-80 (discussing CDF
responsibility for atrocities).
299.
See supra Part IV.A.
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trial. 30 0 Given that narratives of victimhood are nearly universal in
ethnic conflicts, it is not surprising to find that demands for justice
are nearly universal as well. The problem lies in what the various
groups mean by justice.
What groups seem to mean by their demand for justice is a kind
of justice that is consistent with their dominant internal narrative
about the conflict. In other words, what they want is for the other
groups to be held responsible and punished. 30 1 When courts validate
this internal narrative they are perceived favorably, when they act
inconsistently with this narrative, they are viewed negatively. This
presents courts with a problem. Even if we were to pursue whatever
form of justice resulted in positive perceived legitimacy of the court
(on the theory that this is crucial to the success of transitional
justice), it simply would not be possible to make everyone happy in
legitimacy is a
Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina because perceived
30 2
negative sum game in these two situations.
If the fundamental problem is a mismatch between dominant
internal narratives and the realities of the conflict, this suggests that
the solution is to try to align the two. After all, if groups had a
realistic view of their role in the conflict (both as victims in some
instances and as perpetrators in others), then indictments of
members of the group would not be as likely to lead to negative
perceived legitimacy. But this is more than simply a solution to
problems of perceived legitimacy. Inaccurate internal narratives that
cast each group as the victim of crimes committed by other groups are
an impediment to post-conflict reconciliation. 30 3 Thus, trying to align
dominant internal narratives with reality not only helps rehabilitate

Eighty-eight percent of Sierra Leoneans would like to see those responsible
300.
for crimes during the war put on trial, while 91 percent of Cambodians would like to
see those who were responsible for what happened during the Khmer Rouge regime
held accountable. BBC WORLD SERV. TRUST, supra note 185, at 53; PHAM ET AL., supra
note 213, at 31. Even in the former Yugoslavia, 90 percent of the population wants to
see those responsible for war crimes put on trial. ICRC, supranote 35, at 24.
See, e.g., ICRC, supra note 35, at 24-25 (indicating former Yugoslavians'
301.
belief that members of ethnic groups other than their own should be prosecuted and
punished for war crimes).
302.
For a discussion of the competing groups in Kosovo and BosniaHerzegovina, see supra Part N.B.
Professor Bar-Tal argues that reconciliation requires a change in attitudes
303.
toward the past and toward the group. Groups must examine their sense of
victimization and come to terms with what really happened, including accepting
responsibility for harms committed by the group. Bar-Tal, supra note 122, at 258; see
also Staub, supra note 279, at 868 ("The essence of reconciliation is a changed
psychological orientation toward the other [group]."); id. at 873 ('The inability to
acknowledge harmdoing interferes ... with reconciliation .. ").Naive realism may
also play a role in increasing intergroup distrust, polarizing groups' views, and making
reconciliation more difficult. See Kahan, supra note 65, at 22 (explaining how naive
realism can lead to even greater divisiveness between conflicted parties).
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the image of international criminal courts (and other transitional
justice mechanisms), it also opens the door to reconciliation within
304
society.
On the other hand, pursuing positive perceived legitimacy as an
end in itself is self-defeating. Even in situations where perceived
legitimacy is not a negative sum game, pursuing positive perceived
legitimacy would require the court to determine its prosecution
strategy by looking at how the indictment of certain individuals
would offend groups within the affected population. For example, the
Special Court could have refused to indict members of the CDF and
simply indicted members of the RUF and AFRC. Perceptions of its
legitimacy among Sierra Leoneans, particularly in the South and
East of the country, would have probably been significantly better.
But would this have led to greater internalization of norms of
international criminal law or a more successful post-conflict
reconciliation?
One obvious point is that prosecution strategy should be driven
by evidence of responsibility for serious violations of international
criminal law, not by which side has more supporters. 30 5 But perhaps
an argument could be made that we should adopt a more flexible
notion of justice if this is necessary to improve perceptions of
legitimacy and thereby increase the chances of reconciliation.
Unfortunately, focusing on improving perceptions of legitimacy would
often require catering to inaccurate internal narratives about
victimhood and is likely to make post-conflict reconciliation more
difficult, not easier. 30 6 Groups that perceive themselves as victims
exhibit biased information processing, reduced feelings of
accountability, a sense of moral entitlement, the rationalization of
immoral acts against members of other groups, and the perpetuation
of violence. 30 7 Failing to address dominant internal narratives of

304.
See Staub, supra note 279, at 881 ("Consideration of injuries to both sides,
even if substantially unequal, makes the development of a shared history, of shared
collective memories possible."); Wohl & Branscombe, supra note 117, at 290 (arguing
that intergroup conflict can be reduced if group members are able to relinquish
negative feelings directed toward the perceived transgressor group).
305.
See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 1, at 1449 (arguing that perceived
legitimacy is one factor, but not the decisive one, the ICC Prosecutor should consider
when deciding which cases to pursue). Professor deGuzman identifies the scale of the
crimes, the nature of the crimes, the manner of commission of the crimes, the impact of
the crimes, the role of the perpetrator, and the intent of the perpetrator as key factors
in prosecutorial discretion. Id. at 1451-56.
306.
See Bar-Tal, supra note 120, at 230 (noting that the collective feelings of
victimization is "a factor that feeds continuation of the conflict and [is] an inhibitor of
peacemaking").
307.
Id. at 252-56; see also Sherman & Cohen, supra note 67, at 219-20
(discussing how a person's motivation to preserve their sense of worth can lead to a
sense of personal impunity and even immoral behavior).
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victimhood can allow these narratives to become part of the groups'
collective memory, where they may linger for generations, negatively
affecting future attempts to resolve the underlying conflict between
groups. 30 8 Such feelings of victimization may, in fact, be the catalyst
of and justification for new episodes of violence against rival
groups.30 9 This strongly suggests that simply pursuing positive
inaccurate
perceived legitimacy by catering to self-serving and
31 0
internal narratives about the conflict is not the solution.
D. The Limits of Motivated Reasoning
The discussion above suggests a role for international criminal
courts in reconciliation by trying to break down inaccurate internal
narratives about the underlying conflict. Courts could do this by
fairly and impartially prosecuting crimes committed by all groups,
and by collecting and making available evidence that persuades
groups that perceive themselves as victims to see their role in the
conflict more realistically. This will almost certainly result in a
negative perception of courts in the short term as they take actions
that are inconsistent with various groups' dominant internal
narratives. However, this technique might ultimately have a big
payoff if it helps reconcile the various groups within society. 311 In this
process, negative perceptions of legitimacy would be a necessary price
paid by courts for trying to break down inaccurate internal narratives
regarding responsibility for the crimes.
But is it possible for courts to play a role in breaking down
dominant internal narratives of victimhood? Of course, courts cannot

See Bar-Tal, supra note 120, at 236-37 (indicating that a collective sense of
308.
victimhood can become encoded in the collective memory, lasting for generations);
Staub, supra note 279, at 870 (explaining how victimized groups may carry the impact
of the harms against them, frustrating their sense of place in the world); Wohl &
Branscombe, supra note 117, at 288 ("[Tjhe negative feelings resulting from intergroup
conflict linger on long after the violence itself has terminated.").
See Bar-Tal, supra note 120, at 238 (suggesting that collective victimhood
309.
may lead to a sense of nationalism that can spark a war); Staub, supra note 279, at 871
(discussing how groups that were previously victimized might strike out against others
who even later are still perceived to be dangerous).
See Jeremy Sarkin, The Tension Between Justice and Reconciliation in
310.
Rwanda: Politics, Human Rights, Due Process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in
Dealing with the Genocide, 45 J. AFR. L. 143, 144 (2001) (arguing that knowing about
abuses of the past is a crucial part of the post-conflict reconciliation process, and that
ignoring that past leads to a "collective amnesia" that is illusory as the "unresolved
past will inevitably return to haunt the citizens").
See Bar-Tal, supranote 120, at 258 (positing that conflicts could be resolved
311.
if each side assumed responsibility for its actions); Kahan, supra note 65, at 22
(explaining how self-victimization can further divide parties); Staub, supra note 279, at
868, 873 (suggesting that a party's changed perception of the opposing group may
increase the likelihood of reconciliation).
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be expected to break down self-serving narratives on their own.
Effective reconciliation is a process that requires a broad range of
institutions to engage with all aspects of society. 312 Nevertheless, it
may be possible for courts to play a part, however small, in that
process.
We know that cognitive and motivational biases are powerful
forces that can cause us to act in decidedly biased ways, but if they
were all-powerful we would never change our minds about anything.
Beliefs do change over time, so it must be possible to overcome the
effects of these biases. 313 In fact, there are limits to what motivated
thinking can accomplish. All humans believe that their belief systems
are justified and justifiable. 314 People also prize consistency as an
important component of rationality. At some point, if the
countervailing evidence is strong enough and the supporting evidence
weak enough, not even a desire to protect some preferred belief will
3 15
prevent people from changing their minds.
One recent experiment demonstrated both the desire to hold onto
one's current beliefs and the existence of "tipping points" where the
receipt of information inconsistent with a preexisting belief
eventually overcame that initial belief. 316 The experiment involved
the subjects' attitudes toward fictional presidential candidates. First,
the subjects' political orientation was assessed and they were
presented with a fictional candidate that matched their own political
orientation. Unsurprisingly, they approved of this candidate. They
were then given varying levels of incongruent information about their
candidate (information which indicated the candidate did not share
their political orientation). Consistent with the effect of attitude
polarization, 317 subjects that received only small amounts of
incongruent information actually had increased approval levels.
However, as the amount of incongruent information was increased,
subjects eventually reached a "tipping point" at which they
reevaluated their initial positive attitude toward the candidate in
light of the incongruent information they had received and then

312.
Staub, supra note 279, at 873.
313.
Ross & Anderson, supranote 162, at 151-52.
314.
See supra notes 77-80 (discussing the illusion of objectivity).
315.
Nickerson, supra note 147, at 197; see also supra notes 77-80 (arguing that
our desire to view ourselves as rational and objective limits the effects of motivated
reasoning).
316.
Redlawsk et al., supra note 158, at 579.
317.
See Lord et al., supra note 158, at 2099 (discussing how proponents of a
belief will rationalize evidence that contradicts their belief in a manner that lends
support, ultimately bolstering their belief); Taber & Lodge, supra note 71, at 764-67
(demonstrating that people's biases are polarized when faced with contradictory data).
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formed a new and significantly more negative attitude toward the
318
candidate.
There is no reason to believe the particular tipping point found
319
in Professor David Redlawsk's experiment is a universal constant.
Nevertheless, his experiment elegantly demonstrates that tipping
points do exist and that people will eventually revise their initial
beliefs to take into account new evidence that is inconsistent with
their beliefs. 320 Thus, it must be possible for groups to reevaluate
their internal narratives of victimization. They will hold onto their
beliefs long past the point where logic would suggest they should be
reevaluated, but as evidence that their narrative is flawed
accumulates, eventually they will reach a tipping point and a more
reasonable narrative will emerge. There is evidence that this process
has occurred in Germany and that it may be underway in the former
3 21
Yugoslavia.
E. The Role of Courts in ChangingInternal Narratives
In the years after WWII, Germans adopted an internal narrative
of victimhood and largely denied personal responsibility for the
horrors of WWII and the Holocaust.3 22 As the social psychology model
predicts, reactions to the International Military Tribunal (IMT)
among West Germans were overwhelmingly negative, with 59 percent
of West Germans in the 1950s saying that they disapproved of the
way the Allies handled war crimes trials, and only 10 percent

318.
Redlawsk et al., supra note 158, at 579.
319.
Id. at 590. One would not expect the subjects in his experiment to be deeply
committed to fictional presidential candidates, and thus their tipping point might be
quite low. One would expect the tipping point to be significantly higher in situations
where the attitude being protected is much more important to the individual, for
example in situations where the attitude relates to one's self-view or social identity.
320.
See id. at 579 (demonstrating that once a person is presented with enough
incongruent data, that person reconsiders their belief).
321.
See infra Part IV.E (discussing the changing political perceptions in
Germany and former Yugoslavia).
322.
See Gunnar Theissen, Between Acknowledgement and Ignorance: How
White South Africans Have Dealt with the Apartheid Past ch. 2.10 fig.2.8, CENTRE
STUDY VIOLENCE & RECONCILIATION, http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/papgtO.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (noting that in 1951, 63 percent of Germans agreed with the
statement, "The Germans have no reason to feel guilty nor to feel responsible for
compensations. Only those who have really been actively involved are guilty and
should also feel responsible for what they have done," and that only 4 percent of
Germans agreed with the statement, "Every German is to a certain degree guilty").
Theissen also notes that during the 1950s Germans identified German soldiers who
died during the war and ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern Europe as the principal
victims of WWII. Id. ch. 2.10.
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expressing approval. 323 As Christoph Burchard has noted, "Reports of
post-war Germany support the view that the Nuremberg trial was
never endorsed, either politically or morally, by the West German
public."324 Hannah Arendt believed that the lack of support for the
IMT was a symptom of a "deep-seated, persistent and sometimes
brutal refusal to acknowledge past events and to come to terms with
them. '325 It appears that Germans seized upon the flaws in the
IMT 326 as a rationale for rejecting its conclusions and preserving
their internal narrative of victimization. 32 7 The rejection of the IMT
also caused most German academics to reject the norms of
international criminal law.

3 28

Over time, however, Germans underwent a change in their views
about WWII. Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, Germans generally
came to accept responsibility for what happened during WWII, 329 at

323.
Christoph Burchard, The Nuremberg Trial and Its Impact on Germany, 4 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 800, 812-13 (2006). West German lawyers and legal academics also
viewed the IMT quite negatively, focusing on issues of victor's justice and nullum
crimen sine lege. Id. at 802-10.
324.
Id. at 813; accord Donald Bloxham, The Nuremberg Trials and the
Occupation of Germany, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599, 1600 (2006) (arguing that in the
aftermath of Nazi rule, both the "medium and the message" of the IMT were "decisively
rejected" by the West German public).
325.
Burchard, supranote 323, at 813.
326.
There were undoubtedly flaws in the IMT. For instance, its approach to the
principle of legality was driven largely by political rather than legal considerations. See
Stuart Ford, Crimes Against Humanity at the ExtraordinaryChambers in the Courts of
Cambodia: Is a Connection with Armed Conflict Required?, 24 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J.
125, 140-41, 197 (2007).
327.
Burchard suggests something along these lines, although without any
specific reference to motivated reasoning or cognitive biases. See Burchard, supra note
323, at 823-25 (arguing that Germans used arguments about the flawed nature of the
IMT as a means to claim the role of victim so as to deflect blame for the atrocities
committed during WWII).
328.
See id. at 802-06 (noting that German academics argued that the
Nuremberg trial "highlight[ed] the low standard of international criminal justice" and
that international criminal law was not generally accepted or taught in Germany). This
is consistent with the more traditional literature on perceived legitimacy, which argues
that courts must be perceived positively for populations to internalize the norms they
represent. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 1, at 4. Negatively perceived legitimacy leads to
rejection of both the court and the norms it represents. See id. (proposing that
perceived legitimacy is "require [d]" for internalization of a justice institution's norms).
329.
Gunnar Theissen notes that support for the proposition that Germany was
responsible for World War II grew slowly over time and only reached a clear majority
in 1967. See Theissen, supra note 322, ch. 2.6 fig.2.2. In 1964, only 54 percent of
Germans agreed that the Nazi state had been an unjust state and a criminal regime.
By 1990, this had risen to 85 percent. Id. ch. 2.8 fig.2.6; see also Elisabeth Domansky,
"Kristallnacht,"the Holocaust and German Unity: The Meaning of November 9 as an
Anniversary in Germany, 4 HISTORY & MEMORY 60 (1992). While Domansky repeatedly
suggests that this shift in internal narratives was partly a cynical ploy to rehabilitate
Germany's post-war image and secure international support, and that Germany's
remembrance of the Holocaust is incomplete, it is also equally clear that there was a

470

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45:405

330
If
least in part because of the evidence collected by the IMT.
negative perceptions of the court were created by the court's attack on
the dominant internal narrative of victimhood, then one would expect
that a more realistic internal narrative would reduce the tension
caused by the IMT's judgment and pave the way for a more positive
perception of the IMT in Germany. And indeed, this is what
happened.3 31 This development in turn led to Germany's
internalization of the norms of international criminal law. Germany
joined the ICC and incorporated international criminal law into its
domestic criminal law, and international criminal law is now taught
3 32
in German law schools.
A similar process may be underway among ethnic Serbs in the
former Yugoslavia. There is evidence that growing numbers of Serbs
have accepted that some of the worst crimes committed in the
Balkans, including the shelling of Sarajevo and the massacre at

real change in the dominant internal narrative among Germans. See, e.g., id. at 62, 69,
70-71, 72-73.
330.
See Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Norm Internalization Through Trials for
Violations of InternationalLaw: Four Conditions for Success and Their Application to
Trials of Detainees of Guantanamo Bay, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 427, 438-39 (2009)
(describing the IMT as the best example of an international court using its historical
record to help "reorient the German population from a militaristic past to its liberal
democratic present" even if direct evidence of its effect is hard to pin down); Staub,
supra note 279, at 881 (suggesting that the evidence presented during the Nuremberg
trials made it more difficult for the Germans to deny their actions or responsibility for
the harm caused). But see Bloxham, supra note 324, at 1599-600 (arguing that the IMT
trials were designed with the goal of "engineering a narrative of the Nazi period" that
would reeducate Germans about their role in the Holocaust, but concluding that this
largely failed, at least in the immediate aftermath of World War II). Part of the
difficulty in showing whether the IMT affected German attitudes toward World War II
is that German attitudes immediately after World War II were not positively affected
by the IMT. The effect, if any, was felt much later. Yet historians have seemed to
conclude that because no effect was felt immediately, no effect occurred. See Bloxham,
supranote 324, at 1599-600 (arguing that the change in German attitude was due to a
generational change and not any impact by the IMT); Martti Koskenniemi, Between
Impunity and Show Trials, in 6 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 1, 45 (Christiane E. Philipp ed., 2002) (focusing on whether the IMT had an immediate
effect). Instead, emphasis is placed on the "generation of 1968" as a crucial turning
point in German attitudes toward the Holocaust. See infra text accompanying note 337.
However, it is clear that the generation of 1968 was itself deeply influenced by a desire
to come to grips with their parents' generation's responsibility for what had happened
during World War II. See, e.g., HANS KUNDNANI, UTOPIA OR AUSCHWITZ: GERMANY'S
1968 GENERATION AND THE HOLOCAUST (2009).
331.
See Burchard, supra note 323, at 820-22 (discussing Germany's later
positive outlook on the IMT and support of the International Criminal Court).
332.
See Bloxham, supra note 324, at 1600 (discussing Germany's now positive
view of the Nuremberg trials and the International Criminal Court); Burchard, supra
note 323, at 822 (discussing Germany's support of the International Criminal Court
and international criminal law generally).
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Srebrenica, occurred and were perpetrated by Serbs. 333 While most
ethnic Serbs are not yet ready for a complete reevaluation of their
role in the conflict, the beginnings of that process may be
underway. 334 And this nascent reevaluation appears to be, at least in
its
part, a result of the evidence accumulated by the ICTY during 335
prosecution of crimes committed during the conflict in the Balkans.
The examples of the IMT and the ICTY demonstrate several
internal narratives of
important points. First, inaccurate
victimization are not immutable, despite the influence of motivational
and cognitive biases. Second, when a group adopts an internal
narrative that is more consistent with what actually happened,
perceptions of the court's legitimacy may rise. Third, there is some
evidence that courts can play a role in causing groups to reevaluate
their internal narratives by collecting evidence and prosecuting
violations of international criminal law. 336 Fourth, when groups
adopt more realistic internal narratives about responsibility, it can
lead to the internalization of the norms of international criminal law
and improve the likelihood of successful reconciliation. And fifth, this
process is not likely to be quick or easy. It took nearly forty years in
Germany, and after nearly twenty years we are just seeing the start
337
of the process in the former Yugoslavia.

333.
See ORENTLICHER, supra note 39, at 86-87 (describing survey results that
show growing acceptance of Serb responsibility over time); Klarin, supra note 38, at 93
(noting that half of Serbs accept that the massacre at Srebrenica took place and that 43
percent think it was a crime). But Srebrenica is one of the most serious and best
documented atrocities. Ethnic Serbs were much less likely to acknowledge that
Kosovar Albanians were the victims of crimes in the run.up to the NATO bombing of
Serbia. Id. (noting that only 14 percent of ethnic Serbs believed that crimes had been
committed in Kosovo by Serbs).
334.
See ORENTLICHER, supra note 39, at 93-94 (discussing how the public
"accepts that Serbs committed enormous crimes" but is still "not yet ready to handle"
ICTY evidence).
Id. at 92-94 (arguing that the work of the ICTY has imposed real
335.
constraints on the dominant internal narrative among the Serb population and made it
much more difficult for Serbians to deny that atrocities took place).
336.
The Author is not taking the position that the changes in the internal
narratives of Germans or Serbs were entirely or even mostly the result of the work of
the IMT or the ICTY, but they do seem to have been, in part, a response to the evidence
those courts collected and publicized. See ORENTLICHER, supra note 39, at 92-94
(arguing that the ICTY has made it more difficult for Serbians to deny that atrocities
took place); Padmanabhan, supranote 330, at 438-39 (discussing how the IMT used its
historical record to "reorient" how Germans viewed its militaristic past); Staub, supra
note 279, at 881 (suggesting that Nuremberg trial evidence made it more difficult for
Germans to deny responsibility for their actions during WWII); Staub, supra note 312,
at 873 (suggesting that the cooperation of several institutions is needed for effective
reconciliation). Courts are never going to be the principal mechanism of post-conflict
reconciliation, but they do have a role to play.
337.
It appears that this is partly a generational process of change as younger
generations are not as devoted to the causes and ideological positions of their
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How can courts help break down inaccurate internal narratives
of victimization? Obviously, their core function is to prosecute
individuals for violations of international criminal law, 338 but they
have other functions as well. 339 One of these additional functions is to
help define what happened. 340 They do this by collecting evidence
about violations of international criminal law. The primary purpose
of this evidence is to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
However, it also creates a (partial) record of what happened during
the conflict. 341 Publication of this evidence might eventually lead to a
reexamination of self-serving narratives of victimization. 342 This
suggests that a court's record-setting function may, in the long run,
be one of its most important functions with respect to its success as a
transitional justice mechanism.

predecessors. For example, in Germany much has been made of the impact of what has
been referred to as the "generation of 1968," a generation of Germans who had not
lived under the Nazis. See Bloxham, supra note 324, at 1600 (arguing that the change
in German attitudes was the result of "generational change" and economic stability);
Burchard, supra note 323, at 820 (noting that German attitudes toward WWII and the
IMT changed in part because "a new generation of judges, politicians and academics"
took a different approach to the past); Domansky, supra note 329, at 72 (discussing the
generation of 1968); Theissen, supra note 322, ch. 2.7 ("This apathy changed after 1968
when a new generation challenged the undemocratic values that had partly dominated
the early years of the Federal Republic.").
338.
Shahram Dana, Turning Point for InternationalJustice?, in XI ANNOTATED
LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 962, 972 (Andre Klip & Goran
Sluiter eds., 2007) ("The primary function of the international criminal tribunal is to
determine the criminal responsibility and punishment of those individuals found guilty
of the crimes under its jurisdiction.").
339.
For example, the Rome Statute's preamble mentions various goals for the
International Criminal Court, including: putting "an end to impunity"; preventing the
commission of future crimes; and fostering respect for "international justice." Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; see
also Regina E. Rauxloh, Negotiated History: The Historical Record in International
Criminal Law and Plea Bargaining,10 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 739, 739 (2010) ("The most
important function of international criminal justice is the restoration of peace.").
340.
Rauxloh, supra note 339, at 740 (arguing that establishing "a historical
record of the roots and the development of the violence is one of the main functions of
all international criminal courts"); see also Janine Natalya Clark, Plea Bargainingat
the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 415, 425 (2009)
(suggesting that the ICTY "considers one of its primary purposes to be the creation of a
historical record").
341.
The record created by international criminal courts is obviously not perfect.
Court staff are not trained historians, courts often have temporal and personal limits
on jurisdiction that exclude some parts of the conflict, and the record created by the
court will largely be limited to evidence that relates to situations that have been the
subject of trials. Nevertheless, in many circumstances the evidence assembled by the
court will be the only large-scale contemporaneous investigation of what happened.
Rauxloh, supra note 339, at 742-44; see also Dana, supra note 338, at 972.
342.
See supra Part IV.D (discussing the possibility of reaching a "tipping point"
where a person's beliefs change upon receiving enough incongruent data).
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Moreover, we can make some tentative predictions about the
forms of evidence that are most likely to cause groups to reconsider
their internal narratives. To begin with, eyewitness testimony by
victims from rival groups is most likely to be discounted because it
contradicts the dominant internal narrative and because there are
doubts about the source of the information.3 43 Thus, one would
probably expect ethnic Serbians to reject as unreliable the eyewitness
evidence of ethnic Bosniaks or Croats (and vice versa). There is some
evidence that expert evidence is more persuasive than eyewitness
testimony, 344 although experts who are from a different group are
probably still likely to be discounted.
Confessions by group members might fare better as they are

admissions of responsibility by a member of one's own group, and
thus there will be less pressure to reject the evidence because of its

source. 345 But unfortunately, the nature of many confessions may
undermine their persuasiveness. 346 Nevertheless, confessions by
group members are likely to be more persuasive than testimony from
victims of rival groups or expert testimony. For example, Biljana

Plav9i6, the former President of the Republika Srpska, made a
dramatic courtroom confession of an organized plan to remove ethnic

Bosniaks and Croats from territory claimed by ethnic Serbs. 34 7 At the
time, this was regarded as an unprecedented admission that would do
much to aid reconciliation, 348 although it is not clear how much direct

343.
See Kahan, supra note 101, at 122 (noting that there is intense pressure to
reject information that contradicts one's beliefs when rival groups are the source of
that information); Nickerson, supra note 147, at 199 (indicating that people tend to
associate more with information sources that share their beliefs).
344.
Jos Hornikx, Comparing the Actual and Expected Persuasiveness of
Evidence Types: How Good Are Lay People at Selecting Persuasive Evidence?, 22
ARGUMENTATION 555, 564-66 (2008).
345.
Of course, there will still be pressure to reject the confessions because they
conflict with the dominant internal narrative.
346.
For example, most perpetrators "speak about their past without necessarily
admitting wrongdoing.... They admit to their role in the security apparatus, but
remain silent or deny participation in, or even knowledge of [crimes]." Payne, supra
note 280, at 116. They may also be vague about key details or portray themselves as
victims. See id. at 117-18 (discussing how perpetrators will portray themselves as
victims of violence and may "forget" certain details); see also Rauxloh, supra note 339,
at 748 (citing Prosecutor v. Momir Nikoli6, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing
Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 2, 2003)) (providing an
example of a confession that was evasive and not fully forthcoming); supra text
accompanying note 280. In addition, their confessions may be dismissed as self-serving
lies designed to secure a lower sentence by those who wish to deny their content. For
an example, see Rauxloh, supra note 339, at 752.
347.
Alan Tieger & Milbert Shin, Plea Agreements in the ICTY, 3 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 666, 671-72 (2005); see also Nancy Amoury Combs, Prosecutor v. Plavgi6, 97 AM.
J. INT'L L. 929, 929-33 (2003) (recounting Plavgi's confession).
348.
Rauxloh, supra note 339, at 750; see Tieger & Shin, supra note 347, at 67174 (suggesting that Nikoli6's public admission was a "step along a path of mounting
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impact it had on Serb attitudes. 349 Serb witnesses in other
confessions have acknowledged that thousands of Bosniaks were
killed in the days following the fall of Srebrenica. 350 It appears that
the cumulative nature of many such admissions has caused Serbs to
reexamine the events surrounding the fall of Srebrenica. 351 And,
while it is not germane to this Article, the effect of confessions on
35 2
victims can be profound.
Physical evidence seems to be the form of evidence most likely to
have an effect on internal narratives. Images in particular appear to
be objective in a way that other forms of evidence do not. 353 One video
in particular is believed to have had a significant impact on how
Serbians viewed the massacre at Srebrenica. The video showed

evidence that made acknowledgement inevitable"). But see Combs, supra note 347, at
933-34 (arguing that Plavgi6's confession was too brief and too vague and that her
refusal to testify against others undermined her claims of sincerity). Professor Dana
argues that Plavii6's confession was limited in key ways, particularly in its failure to
identify other leaders that acted with her and its refusal to describe her actions as
ethnic cleansing, and that therefore it was much less likely to lead to true
reconciliation than might have been the case. Dana, supra note 338, at 964-67. He
ultimately cautions against the tendency to "uncritically treat guilty pleas as a major
contributor to establishing the truth or reconciliation." Id. at 975.
349.
See Combs, supra note 347, at 936 (noting that a majority of people in
Republika Srprska denounced the confession as an act of treachery); Dana, supra note 338,
at 972; Rauxloh, supra note 339, at 751 (suggesting that a confession made for tactical
reasons may actually impede reconciliation). In addition, it appears that Plavgi6 has since
publicly recanted her confession and stated that she is innocent. See Dana, supra note 338,
at 966; Jailed Plavsic Recants Hague Confession, UPI (Jan. 27, 2009)
http://www.upi.com/TopNews/2009/01/27/Jailed-Plavsic-recants-Hague-confessionLUPI68351233070199 (announcing Plav§i's recantation).
350.
Tieger & Shin, supra note 347, at 673; see Combs, supra note 347, at 937
(referencing the Nikoli6 and Obrenovi6 confessions about their roles in the massacre).
351.
See ORENTLICHER, supra note 39, at 86-87, 92-94 (discussing the ICTY
impact on Serbians' gradual acknowledgement of war crimes). Of course, changing Serb
attitudes toward Srebrenica are not solely the result of confessions by ethnic Serbs. See
id. at 104-05 (discussing the impact of video evidence on Serbian perceptions).
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to suppose that the confessions are at least partly
responsible for the change in attitude.
352.
See Clark, supra note 340, at 428-29 (discussing how a defendant's
confession can provide victims with a degree of closure); Combs, supra note 347, at 937
(recounting a survivor's "sense of relief' upon surfacing of Serb confessions); Tieger &
Shin, supra note 347, at 672 (discussing the "powerful impact" of admissions on the
victims).
353.
See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v.
Harris and the Perilsof Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009). Professor
Kahan's point was that, despite the fact that eight of the Justices of the Supreme Court
in Scott v. Harris found the imagery so compelling that they thought no reasonable
juror could doubt their interpretation, a significant minority of Americans did interpret
the video differently. In other words, images may have an illusion of objectivity but
they are still ultimately subjective because they must be interpreted by an individual
to have meaning. Nonetheless, they may be more persuasive because of their
appearance of objectivity.
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members of a Serbian paramilitary group called the Scorpions
executing Bosniaks in the aftermath of Srebrenica. 354 The power of
the video lay principally in its authenticity-it was made by the
Scorpions themselves-and its apparently objective representation of
reality. The video was shown repeatedly on television throughout the
former Yugoslavia and caused a palpable change in Serbian opinion
toward the massacre at Srebrenica. 355 Having said that, one-third of
6
Serbs still believed the video was fabricated.3 5 Nonetheless, it is this
sort of evidence that is most likely to prompt a reevaluation of
inaccurate and self-serving narratives of victimization.

V. CONCLUSION

Using surveys of attitudes toward various international criminal
courts as well as the latest research in social psychology, this Article
proposes a new model for understanding how populations affected by
violence perceive the courts set up to address that violence. According
to the social psychology model, when there is a strong identification
between groups within the affected population and the participants in
the conflict, perceptions of the legitimacy of tribunals are driven
primarily by the interaction between who the tribunal indicts and the
dominant internal narratives among the various groups. If the court's
indictments contradict a group's dominant internal narrative about
responsibility for the conflict, then the court will be perceived as
biased and unjust by members of that group. This perception permits
members of the affected group to dismiss the court's indictments and
preserve their own internal narrative. This effect is probably the
result of a combination of motivated reasoning and various cognitive
biases, what Professor Dan Kahan has referred to as "cultural
'357
cognition.
The social psychology model provides a better explanation of how
the ICTY was perceived in the Balkans than the traditional model of
perceived legitimacy. It also better explains attitudes toward the
SCSL, the ECCC, the Regulation 64 Panels in Kosovo, and the IMT.
Perhaps more importantly, the social psychology model will probably
apply in the majority of post-conflict situations. In short, it has
significantly more explanatory power and utility than the traditional
model of perceived legitimacy, and represents an advance in how we
understand the perceived legitimacy of international criminal courts.

354.
355.
356.
357.

ORENTLICHER, supra note 39, at 104.
Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 105.
Kahan, supra note 65, at 23.
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Moreover, there are good theoretical reasons to believe that the social
psychology model is not limited to courts and that it is applicable to
transitional justice mechanisms more broadly.
The implications of the social psychology model are profound. It
suggests that, in many cases, the fundamental problem that courts
face is a mismatch between different groups' internal narratives
about the conflict and the realities of the conflict. This mismatch is a
consequence of the human tendency to perceive our own actions in
the best possible light, while simultaneously viewing the actions of
rivals as aggressive and unjust. In effect, people have a strong
tendency, both at the individual and group level, to view themselves
as the victims of unjust and immoral acts by rivals, irrespective of
whether this is true. This misplaced sense of victimization causes the
negative perception of courts when they indict members of one's own
group and acts as an impediment to post-conflict reconciliation.
If the problem is a mismatch between dominant internal
narratives about responsibility and what actually happened during
the conflict, then courts (and other transitional justice mechanisms)
may be able to contribute to successful reconciliation by trying to
break down inaccurate and self-serving narratives of victimization.
Thus, contrary to what most theorists of perceived legitimacy have
argued, negative perceived legitimacy may not be a sign of failure.
Rather, a court that seeks to more closely align internal narratives
with what actually happened will almost inevitably be perceived
negatively in the short term. However, if the court contributes to
altering narratives, then perceptions of the court's legitimacy should
improve, the affected population will internalize the norms of
international criminal law, and successful reconciliation will be more
likely. Of course, courts cannot be expected to change internal
narratives on their own. This is a process that involves actors
throughout society. Nevertheless, courts can play a role in this
process, and there is evidence that this has occurred in Germany and
that it may be occurring in Serbia. Thus, in certain circumstances,
short-term negative perceived legitimacy mAy simply be the price
that must be paid for international criminal courts to be successful.

